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ABSTRACT 
Deliberative democratic theorists contend that legitimate democratic decision-
making must proceed through reasoned and inclusive discussion. Deliberative theories 
of democracy have been subject to critique, but these critiques generally focus not on 
whether quality deliberation is desirable but rather on whether it is achievable, as a 
practical matter. 
To address the question of whether and how deliberative ideals might be 
achieved, and through what method, I examine interest-based or integrative problem-
solving as a successful model that might provide such insights. Focusing on three 
instances of its usage to address complex, multi-stakeholder issues in the labor-
management context, I demonstrate how integrative models have enabled participants to 
overcome historically toxic relationships, incorporate participation by stakeholders with 
different perspectives and needs, and address tumultuous changes in their fields and 
institutions.  
I then unpack the mechanics of interest-based methodology, beginning by 
examining its theoretical origins in the work of Mary Parker Follett. Building on that 
theoretical foundation, I examine how Follett’s theories have been implemented in 
contemporary interest-based processes, focusing in particular on how Follett’s 
transformative view of conflict resolution contrasts with the more transactional model 
promoted by most deliberative democrats. This difference is directly reflected in the 
techniques used in Folletian conflict resolution processes, which seek to capitalize on the 
existence of conflict to drive effective and meaningful participation. Follett’s integrative 
methods, I contend, directly answer many of the critiques of traditional processes of 
deliberative democracy.  
Last, I consider the implications of interest-based methods for political decision-
making. These include what types of issues, communities, and participants most lend 
			 ii 
themselves to deliberative models of decision-making; the critical role of training and 
facilitation to the success of deliberative models; and the ways in which process can be 
used to address the issues of capacity, power, epistemology, and feasibility that have 
plagued more traditional modes of deliberation when empirically tested. From this 
analysis, I conclude that interest-based models are worthy of continuing study and 
implementation in the political context, and I suggest avenues of further potential study 
and trial implementation. 
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Preface 
 
At the outset, I should like to ask you to agree for the 
moment to think of conflict as neither good nor bad; to 
consider it without ethical pre-judgment; to think of it not 
as warfare, but as the appearance of difference, difference 
of opinions, of interests. . . . 
 
As conflict – difference – is here in the world, as we cannot 
avoid it, we should, I think, use it. Instead of condemning 
it, we should set it to work for us. 
 
- Mary Parker Follett (1926a, 30) 
 
This is a strange moment in our political history to be writing, optimistically, 
about the power of talk to bridge disagreements between those of opposing viewpoints 
and positions. We have just completed a national election marked by increasingly heated 
rhetoric on both sides and culminating in a contest close enough that, for the second 
time in twenty years, the candidate who won the electoral college lost the popular vote 
(DeSilver 2016). Months after the election is complete, each side continues to investigate 
the other, trading accusations of foreign interference in the election results and massive 
voter fraud (Bierman 2017; Ingram 2017). The animosities reflected in the campaign 
cycle have continued, and even deepened, in the months since the votes were counted. 
Millions of protesters marched around the country, and in sister protests worldwide, the 
day after the new president was sworn into office (Booth and Topping 2017). Protests 
from both sides have continued for months, on a variety of issues (Crowd Counting 
Consortium 2017).  
Animosity between those of differing views has escalated from a war of words to 
instances of physical violence and even deaths, with a sharp increase in reported hate 
crimes and frequent reports of violence being preceded or incited by public statements 
on contested political issues (ProPublica 2017). A candidate for Congress physically 
assaults a reporter who questions his position on a policy issue, gets elected a few days 
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later, and pleads guilty to having committed the assault (Marcos 2017). A state lawmaker 
threatens to call immigration enforcement to deport protesters holding signs in a 
legislative gallery and threatens to shoot another legislator who objects (Haag 2017). A 
supporter of one presidential candidate shows up at a baseball field where members of 
Congress are practicing for the annual intramural game, checks with bystanders to make 
sure the team practicing is made up of the opposing party, and then opens fire (Shear, 
Goldman, and Cochrane 2017).  
Many of our existing institutions seem to be similarly captured by these forces of 
conflict. Television news programs feature panels of participants talking over each other 
simultaneously from their own tiny boxes in a split-screened cacophony (Carvel et al. 
2017). Internet sources stream into the echo chambers of social media, feeding on 
confirmation bias to get a steady stream of “clicks” and “shares” from like-minded 
readers (Burleigh 2017; El-Bermawy 2016). Colleges and universities find invited 
speakers with controversial views drowned out by disruptive and even physically violent 
protests, to the point that some schools have withdrawn speaking invitations citing 
safety concerns (Hartocollis 2017; Ramaiyer 2017). Attempts by elected officials to hold 
town hall-style meetings with their constituents descend into shouting and chaos (Foran 
2017; Menkel-Meadow 2011; Taylor 2017). 
Our discordant and conflict-ridden politics appear to have negative effects on the 
substance of policy making, as well. At federal and state levels, conflicts among 
lawmakers result in actual or threatened government shutdowns (when a budget deal 
cannot be struck), the suspension of longstanding internal rules governing debate and 
disagreement, and litigation and threats of retribution between branches (Bolton 2017; 
Eckholm 2016; Tareen 2017). Voters express a lack of confidence in government and 
political parties (Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research 2016). Most 
troublingly, there is some indication that voters caught up in contentious campaign 
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rhetoric do not fully understand the positions of the candidates they are voting to 
support. In one recent example, voters who supported a presidential candidate based on 
his opposition to the incumbent’s health care policy indicated, on a survey administered 
shortly after the election, that they actually supported and benefited from that policy and 
did not want it to be discontinued (Dropp and Nyhan 2017). They simply had not 
understood that the program the presidential candidate was enthusiastically promising 
to eliminate was the same as the program they liked and wanted to keep. 
In contrast to this evidence of escalating conflict and declining discourse all 
around me, my personal experiences of conflict over the last several years have been 
largely positive. In that time, I have served as a participant, facilitator, and/or trainer for 
a particular method of participatory decision-making called interest-based negotiation 
(IBN) or interest-based problem-solving, as it was adopted by various institutions and 
communities engaged in contract negotiation, policy making, and conflict resolution. In 
those settings, I have seen participants who began from positions of significant 
disagreement reach mutually agreeable solutions to long-standing problems and 
strengthen their working relationships going forward. This has been true even when the 
negotiations followed periods of significant animosity, involved participants who were 
openly skeptical and dismissive, and addressed complex policy issues constrained by 
limited resources and power differentials among the various constituencies involved. 
From my own experiences, then, the question arises: what makes some methods 
of discourse between those of differing viewpoints work, while others fail? That is the 
matter I set out to investigate here, first by examining the theory and application of 
interest-based problem-solving as it has developed from industrial relations and then by 
extrapolating its potential lessons for the resolution of conflicts in the political sphere. 
My project fits within the larger corpus of work examining deliberative models of 
democracy, including those theorists who contend that legitimate democratic decision-
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making must proceed through reasoned and inclusive discussion. Like those theorists, 
my work arises from concerns regarding apparent limitations in the ability of our politics 
to handle disputes among members of the same community who may hail from different 
backgrounds, hold different doctrinal beliefs, or pursue inconsistent goals. 
I therefore begin by surveying the work of deliberative democrats, describing the 
two schools of thought from which theorists have prescribed deliberation as the 
appropriate democratic response to policy disagreements between members of a political 
community and what exactly they mean by deliberation that is democratic in character. I 
then turn to critiques of deliberative democracy, with the aim of providing a similar 
survey of the richly developed existing literature.  
As I note below, few of these critiques attack the goals of the deliberative 
democrats – no one seems to be arguing that it would be a bad thing to make policies 
after conducting a rational and respectful debate among interested parties and 
incorporating the insights of that debate into the policy decision. Instead, critiques of 
deliberative democracy raise serious concerns about whether such an idealized model of 
decision-making could ever actually be achieved. These critiques generally fall into four 
categories. The first category, capacity, raises concerns about whether enough citizens 
have the skills and/or the time to participate effectively in deliberative processes, as well 
as whether cognitive limitations may interfere with the ability of deliberation to bridge 
gaps between participants. An overlapping but distinct second category involves 
epistemological concerns, namely that even sufficiently skilled participants are 
hampered because as a matter of cognitive capability and/or social dynamics, it is 
difficult or even impossible for them to effectively understand their own positions well 
enough to articulate those positions and evaluate competing proposals put forth by 
others. Both of these categories feed into a third concern, regarding whether differentials 
of power undercut the very legitimacy of deliberative models, to the extent that societal 
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inequalities extrinsic to the deliberative process will be replicated within that process 
and thereby deny individuals who already bear the burden of those inequalities an 
effective opportunity to participate. Last, some objectors contend that there are a 
significant number of policy issues on which the disparate views of citizens are 
sufficiently far removed that consensus is not feasible, such that deliberation is simply a 
waste of time and disagreements should be resolved by alternative means. Consistent 
with these concerns, deliberative democracy has also been the subject of empirical 
testing that has revealed significant apprehensions about whether it can work in real-
world scenarios, including studies that have found deliberation to increase bias and 
discord rather than promoting consensus and peaceful coexistence.  
Drawing from the existing literature’s apparent concerns regarding whether 
deliberative ideals are achievable in real-world scenarios, I then turn to the primary 
focus of my work: a more detailed examination of interest-based problem-solving as a 
model that has achieved some success and might provide such insights. Here, a 
methodological note is necessary. In this study, I am primarily concerned with 
undertaking an analysis of methodologies that have had some success in the resolution 
of interpersonal conflict, in the hope that that analysis might yield insights that can be of 
use both to those attempting to improve the quality of democratic decision-making in 
real-world settings and to those who are attempting to theorize regarding such decision-
making. This focus falls within the tradition of American pragmatism, with its particular 
emphasis on the utility of theory to resolve specific problems, as demonstrated in the 
work of Mary Parker Follett that is the primary subject of my inquiry here. And, like 
Follett, my own work is inspired by my personal experiences with conflict resolution and 
attempts to derive more generally applicable insights from those experiences (and those 
of others in similar settings). 
			 x 
But in adopting a pragmatic focus, I am necessarily not addressing on many of 
the complex and interesting questions that have occupied democratic theorists and 
deliberative democratic theorists. The existing and developing literature reveals a wealth 
of viewpoints and ongoing controversies on important questions such as the nature of 
representation, the characteristics that render a political decision legitimate, or even 
what is meant by the “common good.” To write about the nature of decision-making in a 
democracy requires the use of language that, as a matter of political theory, is hotly 
contested. However, for purposes of this work, my endeavor does not attempt a 
resolution of those disputes, nor would doing so make a substantive difference in the 
outcome of what I am considering here. In effect, I am holding these concepts steady for 
purposes of my discussion, rather than interrogating them. 
I begin my pragmatic endeavor by examining in detail three specific cases in 
which interest-based models have been used to address complex, multi-stakeholder 
issues, drawn from a context in which those methods are most frequently used: labor-
management relations. In these cases, I explore how the implementation of interest-
based processes has enabled labor and management representatives to overcome 
historically toxic relationships, incorporate participation by subgroups of administrators 
and employees with different perspectives and needs, and address tumultuous changes 
in their fields and institutions. From those case studies, I conclude the interest-based 
models show sufficient real-world success to merit further examination of how those 
models might be translated into the political sphere and whether they might address 
existing critiques of deliberative democracy. 
I then unpack the mechanics of interest-based methodology, beginning by 
examining its theoretical origins in the work of Mary Parker Follett, a political theorist 
and organizational thinker whose work at the turn of the twentieth century underpins 
interest-based models in use in labor-management and other contexts today. Building on 
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that theoretical foundation, I examine how Follett’s theories have been implemented in 
contemporary interest-based processes, focusing in particular on how Follett’s 
transformative view of conflict resolution contrasts with the more transactional model 
promoted by most deliberative democrats. This difference is directly reflected in the 
steps, methods, tools, and techniques used in Folletian conflict resolution processes, 
which seek to capitalize on the existence of conflict to drive effective and meaningful 
participation. Although they are not a panacea or cure-all, Follett’s interest-based 
methods of problem-solving, I contend, directly respond to several critiques of 
traditional processes of deliberative democracy and suggest models that can be 
implemented in more traditional political contexts to aid in the resolution of the disputes 
endemic to collective life.  
Last, I consider the implications of interest-based methods for political decision-
making. In particular, I examine the lessons that can be derived from the success of 
interest-based models. These include what types of issues, communities, and 
participants most lend themselves to deliberative models of decision-making; the critical 
role of training and facilitation to the success of deliberative models; and the ways in 
which process can be used to ameliorate the negative effects of capacity, power, 
epistemology, and feasibility that have plagued more traditional modes of deliberation 
when they are empirically tested. From this analysis, I conclude that interest-based 
models are worthy of continuing study and implementation in the political context, and I 
suggest avenues of further potential study and trial implementation. 
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SECTION ONE 
Deliberative Models of Democracy 
The topic of negotiation is undergoing something of a revival among legal and 
political theorists and philosophers. In the last several years alone, works on 
compromise (Gutmann and Thompson 2012; Margalit 2010), settling (Goodin 2012), 
and constitutional negotiation (Webber 2009), have all addressed the question of how to 
reach agreement using negotiation concepts in the face of apparently intractable political 
conflict. These efforts take place against a backdrop of political rancor so notable that it 
is not surprising to see a major conference held in 2013 at the University of Texas-Austin 
Law School on the topic “Is America Governable?” Current scholarship focuses 
substantially on examining and defining the concepts and values that might be able to 
shape a different, more civil discourse in which decisions can be reached that are 
acceptable to a larger percentage of citizens than the mere 50% + 1 who may have 
prevailed in the last deeply partisan election. 
The integrative theory of politics I advance in this work falls within the broader 
context of these deliberative theories, sharing the goal of bringing disparate members of 
a political community together, in direct communication, to reach mutually agreeable 
solutions. I therefore begin by surveying the dominant theories of deliberative 
democracy, both in terms of why they believe democracy should be more deliberative 
and what they believe represents a deliberative form of democratic decision-making. I 
then turn to critiques of deliberative democracy, examining the various ways in which 
deliberative proposals have met with skepticism regarding their practicality and 
concerns regarding whether deliberation is truly a more legitimate or desirable form of 
decision-making than other available models.  
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Chapter One 
Deliberative Democracy as a Cure for the Ills of 
 Adversarial, Partisan Politics 
Deliberative theories of democracy critique characterizations of politics as a 
fundamentally adversarial process, with various actors fighting to obtain, retain, and 
exercise power (Chappell 2012, 3). Understanding politics as adversarial competition, 
deliberative theorists contend, is too limited both in description and in aspiration. 
Regardless of whether the focus is on the post-election struggles between elected 
officials, the contest among competing interest groups, or the operation of a rational 
choice model, adversarial models of politics assume a citizenry inherently at odds, with 
political power the object to be won in a zero-sum game played among them. Advocates 
of deliberative democracy hope to transcend such competition in favor of fostering 
transformative debate among citizens who learn about and take into consideration each 
other’s perspectives before arriving at a common solution (Chappell 2012, 2). Doing so, 
they contend, addresses many of the ills of democracy as it is currently practiced, 
including apathetic, ill-informed voters; low voter turnout; partisan and inflammatory 
political discourse; and the exclusion of less powerful groups (Chappell 2012, 4). 
Theoretical Foundations 
The importance of deliberation to democracy finds its contemporary roots in the 
disparate work of both John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. 
Rawlsian Deliberation and the Role of Public Reason. In A Theory of Justice 
(1971), John Rawls posited the use of a thought experiment he called the “original 
position” as a mechanism for the development of generalizable principles of distributive 
justice. Specifically, Rawls asked decision makers to imagine themselves behind a “veil of 
ignorance,” such that they did not know what position they would ultimately occupy in 
society, what natural skills and capacities they would possess, or even what their 
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conceptions of good would be. Consciously adopting this position, Rawls contended, 
would encourage the development of distributive rules that were as fair as possible for all 
members of society, because a person occupying this original position would be at risk of 
occupying any place in that society, and would therefore become inclined to ensure fair 
treatment no matter what the person’s circumstances ultimately turned out to be. In a 
sense, Rawls was advocating a form of deliberation, namely in that the hypothetical 
decision maker behind the veil of ignorance was being challenged to reflect, repeatedly, 
about the implications a particular distributive choice would have for each of the 
positions that person might ultimately occupy in the society under design. 
In his later work, Rawls responded to criticism that the original position was 
insufficient to address the problem of reaching stable agreements in a pluralistic 
democracy, in part because of the difficulty of asking any person to truly put aside their 
own views and fully occupy the original position on behalf of each of the diverse and 
disparate perspectives of the citizens who make up such a democracy. In Political 
Liberalism (1993), Rawls put forth a new theoretical construct for deliberation regarding 
concepts of the good. Unlike the original position set forth in his earlier work, this new 
model called for deliberation among multiple participants, each representing differing 
comprehensive doctrines or worldviews espoused by some members of the society to be 
governed. Through deliberation, Rawls contended, such participants could reach an 
“overlapping consensus” that each member could reconcile with their own 
comprehensive doctrine, giving them at least a modus vivendi to coexist and, potentially, 
more genuine long-term agreement regarding the organization of their collective society.  
The overlapping consensus model was designed to permit and respect the co-
existence of differing and even inconsistent comprehensive doctrines by asking 
participants in the deliberation to advocate for a consensus through the promotion of 
“public reasons,” or rationales that “all might reasonably be expected to endorse” even if 
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they had different underlying positions regarding comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1993; 
Rawls 1997, 116). Thus a participant could have both a private reason that they wanted or 
would support a particular outcome and a public reason that they shared in the 
deliberation to sway others of differing underlying doctrines to support that outcome. To 
Rawls, it was the act of identifying and articulating such a public reason, or a mutually 
acceptable justification, that demonstrated the necessary respect and reciprocity toward 
other members of the political community to make an overlapping consensus legitimate 
and functional (Rawls 1997, 119; Chappell 2012, 24-25). 
Habermas and Communicative Rationality. If Rawls arrives at deliberation as a 
practical tool to refine the hypothetical constructs by which he seeks to articulate his 
theory, Habermas’s path to deliberation begins with the practical and ends in theory, 
reflecting Habermas’s training as both a sociologist and philosopher and his 
philosophical orientation as a pragmatist. Habermas’s theory of deliberation in the 
political sphere arises from his work on how people’s use of language shapes their own 
identity and the world around them (Chappell 2012, 26-27). For Habermas, the best and 
highest use of this capability is for discourse in which participants use language to share 
information and arrive at a mutual understanding. Habermas describes this state as 
“communicative rationality.” A communicatively rational actor, in contrast to a strategic, 
self-serving one, seeks to arrive at shared, reasonable goals with the other participants in 
the discussion. Habermas believes that the only way to do so is to share valid reasons 
that can be questioned and explored by the other participants, such that the discourse 
itself creates a shared reality through the exchange of information and the refinement of 
understanding.  
Habermas articulates specific conditions that foster an ideal setting for 
communicatively rational discourse: (1) inclusion of everyone able to make relevant 
contributions; (2) equal voice for all participants; (3) freedom to speak honestly, free 
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from either external constraint or internal deception; and (4) lack of coercion in the 
process (Chappell 2012, 27). Meeting these conditions, Habermas contends, increases 
the prospects that the deliberation will be both communicatively rational and will lead to 
the best argument. 
Applying this theory to the political context specifically, Habermas argues that 
proper, communicatively rational discourse is essential to the legitimacy of democracy 
(Habermas 1996b). In Habermas’s view, political debates that espouse “presuppositions 
of rational discourse” are steered, by that value, toward the conditions of communication 
that permit the collective construction of shared values and views on which a 
functioning, politically legitimate democracy functions (Habermas 1996a, 12, 26-27). 
Although his work in this regard remains largely at the conceptual level, rather than 
trying to articulate the specific institutional mechanisms for its implementation, 
Habermas does sketch out the idea that deliberative democracy would have two tracks: 
discourse both in the public sphere writ large and then again in the work of an elected 
legislature that would translate the public’s discourse, using similar tools, into specific, 
binding, and valid legislation.  
The Advantages of Deliberation 
Drawing on these foundations, proponents of deliberative democracy recommend 
implementation of these discursive ideals as a prescription for various perceived ills in 
democratic societies. Deliberative theorists see aggregative methods of decision-making 
(such as voting) as comparatively unsophisticated mechanisms that limit themselves to 
making a decision based on determining the percentage of the electorate that has a 
particular preference (Chappell 2012, 101). Shifting to a deliberative model, they 
contend, turns the focus to the formation and transformation of preferences, which may 
result in different and better decisions than those that would be reached by simply 
counting pre-existing preferences. In this way, deliberative democracy seeks to correct 
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for the “instability, impossibility and ambiguity of aggregative democracy,” particularly 
in a pluralistic context where consensus likely will not be reached without some 
transformative mechanism. In this regard, a deliberative model that expands and 
deepens participants’ consideration of options may result in options that leave them 
substantively better off than the market-competition style of more traditional models of 
competing for votes among interest groups (Manin 1987, 356). The model also has 
autonomy-enhancing benefits for the participants, who can develop civic skills such as 
free inquiry, tolerance, openness, reasonableness, and common sense through their 
participation in deliberative processes (Crittenden 2002, 71, 73). Some deliberative 
theorists, notably Dryzek (2006), also suggest that deliberative models are necessary to 
address those conflicts that are themselves about conflicting discourses and which can 
therefore only be effectively addressed by a process that directly engages with discourse 
and opens up communication between those engaged in otherwise competing discourses. 
Even where consensus is not possible, deliberative theorists contend that the decisions 
reached will be of a higher quality because the act of deliberating forces participants to 
thoroughly examine their own views (in order to explain them), to learn about and 
consider multiple alternatives (possibly changing their preferences), and to deepen their 
understanding of the preferences and views of other participants (Chappell 2012; Elster 
1998, 2, 11).  
Others see the character of the deliberative process itself as intrinsically 
important, particularly in the sense that citizens who have the opportunity to participate 
in a process that is appropriately deliberative and open will recognize the resulting 
collective decision as legitimate, even if they disagree with it substantively (Thompson 
2008, 502-03). Thompson, for example, sees conflict on certain issues as inevitable, and 
deliberative democracy as primarily concerned with how a legitimate collective decision 
can be reached where no consensus is possible (Thompson 2008, 502). This view is 
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similar to what Archon Fung describes as the “principle of affected interests,” the idea 
that political legitimacy is derived from giving those affected by a decision a right of 
equal participation in it, even if the particular decision goes against them (Fung 2013; 
Goodin 2007). 
Deliberative Mechanics 
Deliberative theorists address the question of how to implement their theory at 
both a conceptual and a practical level. 
Conceptual Precursors to Deliberation. Although some theorists begin from a 
Rawlsian model of deliberations, and others align with Habermas, they reach significant 
consensus on the essential characteristics necessary for a process to conform to the 
deliberative ideal. 
In the Rawlsian tradition, Joshua Cohen draws on Rawls’ description of public 
reason as the basis on which deliberative democracies can thrive. In Cohen’s view, 
meaningful implementation of the principle of public reason requires the satisfaction of 
four operational requirements: (1) that the members of the community are bound only 
by the results of their deliberation and that the result is legitimate and binding because it 
was arrived at deliberatively; (2) that the outcome of the deliberation is based on the 
quality of the reasons offered in support of possible outcomes, rather than other forms of 
power; (3) that the members of the community are equally able to participate in the 
deliberation; and (4) that consensus decisions are favored, with majority voting to be 
used only when necessary (Chappell 2012, 25-26; Cohen 1997). Cohen recognizes that 
fulfillment of these requirements requires a context in which freely associated members 
of the community share a commitment to “free deliberation among equals” as the basis 
for legitimate decision-making, without requiring adherence to a common belief 
structure, and that those members recognize and respect each other’s capacity for 
deliberation (Cohen 1997, 72-74). 
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Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004) similarly draw on the concepts of 
reasonableness and reciprocity inherent in the overlapping consensus model. In their 
view, a decision is legitimate when it has been reached through “mutual justification – 
presenting and responding to reasons intended to justify” the decision (Thompson 2008, 
504). Essential characteristics of the discussion include “public-spiritedness, equal 
respect, accommodation, and equal participation” (Thompson 2008, 504).  
Dryzek, drawing on Habermas’s notions of rationality implemented and 
enhanced through acts of communication, defines a system as having deliberative 
capacity “to the degree it has structures to accommodate deliberation that is authentic, 
inclusive, and consequential” (Dryzek 2010, 10). Dryzek’s concept of authenticity is 
concerned both with the ability of the discoursing parties to communicate with those of 
different viewpoints and its ability to encourage reflection among participants without 
coercing them to change their views. By inclusivity, Dryzek indicates that all affected 
persons have the ability and opportunity to participate personally or through 
representatives. Finally, Dryzek contends, a deliberative system must have 
consequences, in the sense that its operations contribute to some real outcome such as 
the adoption of a law or policy or the implementation of a cultural change. 
Implementation of the Deliberative Model. Deliberative theorists generally do not 
focus on making all political processes deliberative, but on either adding deliberative 
processes to complement existing political processes or converting existing processes to 
more deliberative ones, where it is appropriate to do so. Deliberative theorists do not 
contend that all political activity must be deliberative, but rather that legitimate 
decisions must incorporate deliberation and the giving of public reasons (Thompson 
2008, 513-14). The practice of deliberation may be distributed among multiple 
institutions, decentralized to the local level, and may be iterated over multiple stages 
(Thompson 2008, 514-15). 
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Deliberation can also serve purposes beyond decision-making, including setting 
an agenda for subsequent action by representatives, exploration with a goal of increasing 
participants’ substantive knowledge, recommendations used to guide the actions of 
officials, and the development and formation of participants’ preferences (Chappell 
2012, 32-34). Recognizing these additional uses of deliberative methods may provide 
opportunities to incorporate deliberation alongside or within traditional institutions, 
such as in the deliberative polls examined by Fishkin, Luskin, and Jowell (2002) or the 
proposal by Ackerman and Fishkin of a national “Deliberation Day” to permit voters to 
fully develop and refine their preferences before casting ballots (2004). 
Deliberative theorists recognize that context is particularly important, given the 
number of criteria that must be met for a process to be legitimately deliberative. The 
social context for deliberation requires a balance between homogeneity and 
heterogeneity: enough in common for the participants to be able to effectively 
communicate with each other and to wish to do so, but enough difference for there to be 
both an actual and a perceived benefit to working through the discussion to reach a 
resolution (Chappell 2012, 30-31; Dryzek and Braithwaite 2000; Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996).  
Advocates of deliberative democracy recognize that certain topics may be better 
suited for deliberative models. Specific issues with well-defined options may be the 
easiest to tackle when the goal is to have a small group of citizens make a binding 
decision (Chappell 2012, 34-35). More complex issues would likely require the 
involvement of experts and a longer time frame for participants to develop knowledge 
and make informed judgments, potentially excluding those who cannot afford the time 
and effort to participate meaningfully. Issues of the size of the group, its composition, the 
time it will have to dedicate to the process, the confidentiality of the process, and the 
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relationship between the deliberative outcome and formal policy or law making all must 
also be considered and tailored to the question to be undertaken.  
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Chapter Two 
But Will It Actually Work?  
Deliberative Democracy Critiques and Concerns 
The idea that citizens of widely disparate views can come together, learn from 
each other, and come away both personally transformed and committed to the legitimacy 
of a collective decision is certainly attractive, particularly in politically turbulent times. 
Reflecting the appeal of this idea, scholarly reaction to deliberative democracy has 
primarily focused not on whether it should be achieved, but whether it can be. 
In that regard, critics have identified a number of concerns that deliberative 
democracy, as currently framed, may be too ideal a model for practical implementation. 
Paralleling the significant practical obstacles to implementation of deliberative 
democracy are fundamental critiques that undercut the theory’s claim to produce 
decisions that are either legitimate or more legitimate than the decisions produced by 
other democratic decision-making models.  
These critiques fall loosely into four categories, which I address below: concerns 
regarding whether citizens have the necessary capacity to participate in deliberation; 
epistemological objections that developing such capacity may be beyond our abilities 
cognitively and in our social reality; apprehensions that the same power dynamics 
existing in society at large will be replicated within the deliberative context or are 
implicit in theorists’ definition of “deliberation”; and objections based on the view that 
certain disagreements are simply too fundamental to be feasibly resolved regardless of 
the quality of the discourse and the skill of participants. Last, empirical testing of 
deliberative models has revealed significant concerns about whether they can be 
effectively implemented, with disturbing undercurrents suggesting that poorly 
implemented deliberation may actually make the conflict and discord with which 
deliberativists are concerned worse, rather than better. 
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Do Citizens Have the Necessary Capacity to Deliberate Democratically? 
Deliberation of the ideal type that the theorists describe is an intensive, lengthy 
process. Participants must be gathered who represent the range of different views, 
preferences, or comprehensive moral doctrines existing in the community, which means 
that some effort must be made to assay the composition of the community as a whole 
and then to choose which individuals will participate. Too small a group lacks the 
necessary diversity of opinions, while too large a group means that most participants will 
be watching a discussion conducted by others, rather than personally engaging in 
deliberation (Elster 1998, 2). Organizers could also issue a general invitation for 
interested participants, but then risk that the volunteers will not run the gamut of 
necessary views or will be stiflingly homogeneous (Ryfe 2005, 51-54 (addressing 
problems of participant selection)). 
Once an appropriate composition of participants has been identified, if each of 
those participants is to have the opportunity both to offer justifications for their own 
positions and to consider the justifications offered by others, time must be set aside for 
that exchange of ideas to take place, as well as for the ensuing deliberation regarding 
how the various perspectives might be reconciled or a consensus reached. Even for a 
simple issue with few options, a meaningful process could take hours or days; more 
complex issues or more plentiful options would increase the amount of time needed.  
Unless the process builds in some form of compensation for participants, this is 
unpaid time away from work, family, and other obligations. People who have available 
free time and monetary resources are more likely to be able to participate; even if 
participants were compensated for their time, that does not necessarily mean the 
compensation would be sufficient to support participation or even that their other paid 
employment would permit them to be absent from work without being fired. If the 
purpose of deliberative democracy is to reach legitimate decisions by creating 
			 13 
meaningful engagement among all affected members of the community, it cannot be 
implemented in ways that systematically exclude portions of the community. This type of 
exclusion is particularly troubling where the subject of deliberation is one that 
particularly affects the absent group (Shapiro 1999, 32). Similarly, to the extent that the 
persons who are excluded are those who are already structurally disadvantaged, 
exclusion raises significant legitimacy concerns (Sanders 1997, 352; Young 2001, 679-
80). 
Participants may also need outside support in order to facilitate their 
participation. They may need training regarding the process to be used in conducting the 
deliberation (Thompson 2008, 505-06) or factual background information regarding the 
subject of the deliberation and the possible options (Chappell 2012, 35-36). Who 
provides this support, and what stake they have in the issue under consideration, is 
another site of possible contestation and even of improper influence over the process. 
Indeed, the very selection of the issue itself, or the framing of possible outcomes (if 
outcomes are framed to speed the deliberation) carries both the risk and the appearance 
of biases infecting what is intended to be a free and unrestrained deliberation. 
Do We Have the Ability to Develop the Capacity for Deliberation? 
Some critics of deliberative democracy question our capacity at a deeper, more 
foundational level. The critiques of capacity described above are serious, but at least 
potentially solvable through some combination of careful efforts (in selecting and 
training participants and making expertise available) and the dedication of resources (to 
support participation in a time-consuming process without giving up necessary 
employment and other responsibilities). The more foundational strains of critique 
question whether, regardless of care or resources, it is truly possible for humans to 
develop the rational capacities assumed by models of deliberative democracy. 
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The first of these exists in the elitist tradition of critiques of participatory 
democracy, generally described by the view that the critical capacities of citizens are 
sufficiently lacking that participatory democracy is pointless at best and risky at worst 
(Lippmann 1922; Schumpeter 1947). A modern variant of this critique is represented in 
Jason Brennan’s recent volume, Against Democracy (2016), which augments these 
objections with evidence drawn from current cognitive science. Brennan contends that 
citizens fall within three broad categories: hobbits, who are “mostly apathetic and 
ignorant,” uninformed about current issues and generally disinclined to participate; 
hooligans, the “rabid sports fans of politics,” who are actively engaged but hold 
unreflective views and refuse to acknowledge or consider contrary evidence, choosing 
instead to root for “their” team regardless; and vulcans, self-aware and rational actors 
who are dispassionate in evaluating evidence before determining their positions (4-6).  
Based on survey data regarding political knowledge and attitudes, Brennan 
contends that many potential voters are disengaged hobbits, ignorant of many basic facts 
regarding current events and political history and uninterested in (and disincentivized 
from) learning more (14-32). Among voters who are more informed, he locates reckless 
hooligans who are not well informed, in large part due to their susceptibility to cognitive 
biases (36-49). Preexisting beliefs and in-group loyalties exert strong influences on how 
hooligans process new information, with heavy reliance on whether a position is 
identified with a particular “team,” such as a political party, with which the listener feels 
a connection. In-group preferences also support communicating with like-minded 
individuals, rather than seeking out opportunities to converse with those who disagree. 
Confirmation bias causes information supportive of preexisting beliefs to be more easily 
accepted, while contradictory information is rejected, and motivated reasoning is used 
internally to justify what might otherwise be incongruous views.  
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Citizens attempting to educate themselves about political issues are also 
susceptible to manipulation by those providing information, through framing effects, 
peer pressure, deference to authority, and biases that influence our ability to assess 
probabilities. Thus, although voters generally report a subjective desire to vote in the 
common interest, rather than in their own selfish interest, there are significant reasons 
to believe that they are not capable of processing available information well enough to 
ascertain what would be in the common interest that they are attempting to realize (49-
51). 
Dean Mathiowetz, writing in the tradition of critical theory, reaches similar 
concerns about the way in which deliberative conceptions of politics are unwisely 
founded on tidy conceptions of self-interest framed as the rational pursuit of “calculating 
self-regard” (2011, 2). Mathiowetz recounts historical uses of the term “interest” dating 
back to Roman concepts of ownership of real and personal property, through 
seventeenth-century utilizations of the term as a mechanism for “provoking citizen 
action toward a contested notion of the state” (105), demonstrating that the concept of 
interest has a more complex history than modern views would suggest. Viewing interests 
as some state of affairs that has an a priori existence independent of the inherently 
political process of “grouping or constituting political subjects” (204) entirely misses the 
role that making an appeal to interest plays in shaping and reshaping participants’ 
understanding of their stake and goals in political life. This insight has significant 
implications for theories of deliberative democracy. On the one hand, understanding that 
citizens’ interests are not fixed and are instead shaped through discourse could support 
the potential transformative power of deliberative methods. But a darker possibility is 
that the changeable nature of interest may be a site of manipulation and instability that 
could undermine the legitimacy and functioning of a political process reliant on 
deliberation. 
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Will Deliberation Be Captured by the Same Power Dynamics Existing 
Outside the Deliberative Chamber? 
The norms of democratic deliberation may also have the effects both of excluding 
certain citizens and certain types of political problems. To the extent that democratic 
deliberation proceeds by the giving of generally applicable reasons, and an ensuing 
debate regarding which policy is best supported by the asserted reasons, participants will 
be most effective if they are experienced in constructing and articulating those kinds of 
arguments, and comfortable and willing to do so in a public and potentially contentious 
setting. Not all members of a community will have the education, experience, or 
potentially even the language fluency to participate meaningfully in such a process, 
which effectively excludes a group that itself may be otherwise systematically 
disadvantaged (Sanders 1997, 348-49). Moreover, differences in cultural background 
may cause some participants’ contributions to be perceived as outside of acceptable 
norms, notwithstanding that they are expressing views that should (in a deliberative 
model) be entitled to equal respect and consideration. Iris Marion Young uses the 
example of the preference for “rational” over “emotional” speech, with the latter style 
often dismissed even when the ideas expressed are the same (Talisse 2005; Young 2001; 
Young 2000; see also Sanders 1997, 370-72 (comparing testimony with deliberation)). 
Lynn Sanders succinctly articulates this problem as “how do you get more of the people 
who routinely speak less to take part and be heard and how do you get those who 
traditionally dominate to listen?” (Fung 2004; Sanders 1997, 353). This is a question that 
must be answered to implement the equality of participation to which the theories 
subscribe. 
Sanders, in particular, raises grave concerns about the ability of either process 
design or external supports to overcome these problems. Merely providing childcare or 
paid time off, or improving public education such that citizens are equally prepared to 
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present their views will not, she contends, address the fundamental problems (Sanders 
1997). Instead, deliberation will be affected by the same structural inequalities that exist 
outside the deliberative chamber, and, in some instances, deliberative norms will 
actually prevent a deliberative model from fully grappling with the problems caused by 
those inequalities.  
Not only will biased attitudes affect how and whether the participants hear each 
other, but if it is a deliberative tenet “to attend to the force of an argument rather than 
the interests of particular groups,” then how can a deliberative forum take on difficult 
questions of systematic bias toward groups based on attributes such as race or gender 
(353)? To the extent that deliberative processes are driving toward a goal of finding 
common ground, the risk is that “particular perspectives and interests will be effaced, 
especially [those of] minorities or oppressed groups,” where grappling with those 
interests would be an obstacle to identifying an otherwise common resolution (361). “In 
settings where there are gross inequities in power and status,” Sanders contends, “calling 
for compromise may be perilously close to suppressing the challenging perspectives of 
marginalized groups” (362). Paragraph break 
In Sanders’ view, democratic processes can only be made more accessible to more 
participants by grappling with power dynamics directly, “explicitly attend[ing] to issues 
of group dynamics and try[ing] to develop ways to undercut the dominance of higher-
status individuals” (367). And in some instances, increasing the inclusion of democratic 
processes will be accomplished not by pushing toward consensus, but by providing 
opportunities for participants to give testimony (even in emotionally laden ways) 
regarding their stories (370-73). 
To the extent that deliberation takes place among only some representatives of 
the community, rather than all members, deliberative democracy also raises serious 
questions regarding the adequacy and legitimacy of representation (Chappell 2012, 40-
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41). Deliberative theorists see deliberation itself as transformative, whether in the 
Habermasian sense that the act of discourse shapes identity or the Rawlsian sense in 
which participants are expected to seriously consider the public reasons offered by 
proponents of conflicting positions. But if the representative’s view changes, while the 
views of the underlying constituency (who did not participate in the transformative 
deliberation) do not, the legitimacy of the representative’s status as the spokesperson for 
that constituency is jeopardized. Critics of democratic deliberation point to the problem 
of representation as raising significant questions about the possibility of accountability 
in a deliberative model (Mansbridge 2003). For this aspect of deliberation to work, it 
may require either a change in how voters select representatives (for their general 
interests, judgments, and skills rather than their policy positions) and/or the 
development of a second-level of discourse in which the representatives and the 
represented engage in their own transformative dialogue to ensure that the ultimate 
actions of the representative are appropriately reflective of the constituency (Mansbridge 
2003, 521; also Habermas 1996b). 
Do We Face Problems that Deliberation Simply Cannot Solve? 
The prospects of implementing deliberative democracy depend on mustering the 
political will to adopt a process that would potentially take power or discretion away 
from elected officials who currently hold that power (Shapiro 1999, 34). To the extent 
that deliberation advocates avoid this problem by creating deliberative opportunities 
that exist outside of and parallel to governmental institutions, without any mechanism to 
translate those processes into actions, adopting deliberative models does not actually 
enhance the legitimacy of democratic processes because it does not actually affect 
governance (Barker, McAfee, and McIvor 2012, 10). It is well and good to say that 
deliberative democracy may be difficult to achieve, but if it is never actually achieved, 
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then continuing to study and discuss it would not seem to advance the stated goal of 
increasing democratic legitimacy. 
One of deliberative democracy’s primary features, according to its advocates, is 
that it provides a method for persons of differing views to interact in a way that is 
reciprocally respectful, permitting each participant an opportunity for the equal 
consideration of their views and thereby rendering the resulting decision fair even to 
those whose views do not ultimately prevail. The theory therefore depends on a certain 
neutrality, in order that each participant can fully and equally participate and have an 
opportunity to convince others to adopt a particular position. But to the extent that the 
model requires participants to show respect to the views of others with whom they 
fundamentally disagree and to do so through, in its Rawlsian sense, “public reason” 
formulations, it places substantive limits on the types of arguments that are legitimate to 
make during the discussion. As Ian Shapiro points out, these limitations are not only not 
neutral, in the sense that they limit the participation of persons who do not share the 
deliberative ideal, but the limits appear to have a tendency to favor certain conceptions 
of the good that are based on tolerance, to the exclusion of other moral or religious 
doctrines that prioritize ideological conformance (Shapiro 1999, 30-31). If only some 
arguments and resolutions are legitimate, Shapiro worries, deliberative democracy will 
not only be unable to solve certain problems, but it will also likely drive people of 
opposing views apart, raising their consciousness of intractable divides, rather than 
bringing the community together (31-32).  
How Does the Deliberative Model Fare Under Testing? 
Empirical studies regarding the implementation of deliberative democracy bear 
out the seriousness of the concerns discussed above. To the extent that researchers have 
been able to set up and examine deliberative processes based on these models, they have 
found outcomes far from the prescribed ideal, even extending to examples where the 
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deliberative exercise seems to have narrowed views and reinforced prejudices rather 
than leading to the open-mindedness and consensus that its proponents advocate as a 
benefit of deliberation (Thompson 2008, 499). Participants in some studies report low 
levels of satisfaction and exhibit frustration, increases in unproductive emotion, and 
increased power differentials. Participation in politics does not seem to bring us 
together, but instead to make us enemies in ways that spill over to other aspects of our 
communal life (Brennan 2016). 
Indeed, in a 2008 review of the empirical literature, Dennis Thompson, one of 
the major contemporary proponents of deliberative democracy, went so far as to suggest 
that the empirical efforts to examine the theory might be most useful if they were 
directed at “trying to discover the conditions in which deliberative democracy does and 
does not work well,” accepting that those conditions “may be quite rare and difficult to 
achieve” (Thompson 2008, 500). Given Thompson’s leading role in the development of 
the theory of deliberative democracy, that description of its empirical prospects is far 
from a ringing endorsement of its potential for practical implementation. 
Can Interest-Based Models Provide an Answer? 
Although the concerns and objections surveyed in this chapter are serious ones, 
their practical nature points to a potentially fruitful area of further inquiry. If most 
existing critiques identify the problem as not whether democratic deliberation is 
desirable, but whether it is possible, then the next logical step would appear to be to look 
at settings in which deliberation has been successful, in the hope that they might provide 
insights that can be brought to bear on deliberation in the democratic context. 
In the next section, I will undertake such an investigation, focusing on interest-
based or integrative models of negotiation developed primarily in the labor-management 
context. In a sense, my work is similar to that of other political scientists who have begun 
to examine practitioners’ experience with negotiation in the labor and litigation contexts 
			 21 
to identify techniques that could be used to improve cross-party communication in 
legislative and other political contexts (Foster, Mansbridge, and Martin 2013; Warren 
and Mansbridge 2013). However, I go beyond mere examination of the methods of 
interest-based negotiation and their implementation to engage directly with the theories 
in which those methods are grounded, theories that began with the work of Mary Parker 
Follett in the years following World War I.  
Examination of Follett’s theory of integrative problem-solving reveals a 
fundamentally different understanding of conflict than that underlying most theories of 
deliberative democracy, and that understanding drives a conflict resolution methodology 
that largely avoids or answers the traditional objections to deliberative models of 
democratic decision-making I have examined here. Follett’s understanding, developed 
from her own work resolving conflicts in both corporate and community settings, is 
deeply pragmatic and humanistic. She sees conflict as inherent in human life, but 
believes that by acknowledging the inevitability of conflict and seeking to understand its 
origins, we can unlock creative possibilities to live together in greater harmony. By 
delving into the interests driving the conflict, Follett’s model empowers participants who 
might be excluded from more abstract and academic approaches to deliberation and 
avoids the cognitive blocks associated with more positional and transactional models. 
With a comprehensive understanding of interests, participants are better able to identify 
solutions that integrate, or mutually satisfy, as many interests as possible, providing 
incentives to participate rather than using raw power and leading to more meaningful 
and stable solutions.   
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SECTION TWO 
Integrative Deliberation 
The year was 2014, and the location Madison, Wisconsin, in the wake of an 
intensive, multi-year effort to defeat Governor Scott Walker’s attempt to prohibit 
bargaining by public-sector employee unions in the state that had first legalized their 
operation in 1959 (Bauer and Richmond 2013; Greenhouse 2014). After nearly seventy 
years of bargaining as a right, union leaders were faced with not just a loss of bargaining 
power, but a legal prohibition on bargaining at all on any topic other than wages, as to 
which they could bargain only for cost-of-living increases capped at the rate of inflation 
(Greenhouse 2014; Umhoefer 2016). Many public employers in the state would use the 
opportunity to reduce wages and benefits for cost savings and reduce employee 
protections regarding termination for cause, while unions would see their membership 
shrink substantially given their reduced ability to protect and advocate for their 
members (Greenhouse 2014; Umhoefer 2016). 
I had been retained by a community college system whose president had used 
interest-based negotiation (IBN) in his prior service in California. His hope was that IBN 
could help to fill the vacuum created by the new state law and reestablish positive 
working relationships between administration, faculty, and staff that had been battered 
by a long tradition of hard bargaining and the animosity of legislative and court fights 
over passage of the new law. To the extent that an interest-based methodology could be 
used, it would have to be as a mechanism for employee engagement in decision-making 
– interest-based problem-solving rather than negotiation – given that negotiation itself 
was literally illegal except over a miniscule range of issues. 
Skepticism about the utility of this approach was high, particularly among some 
long-time members and leaders of the unions, who had spent the last three years fighting 
the law through political and legislative efforts (including weeks of sit-ins at the state 
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capitol that attracted national media coverage) and court challenges. At the time, an 
appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from a January 2013 Court of Appeals’ decision 
upholding the law was still pending, though it would ultimately fail as the prior efforts 
had (Bauer 2013; Greenhouse 2014). In the end, the administration had asked only that 
the employee representatives agree to attend a training to learn about interest-based 
methods, without committing to participate in any such process.  
Post training, there was a tentative agreement to proceed with using facilitated, 
interest-based sessions to begin to develop policies to replace the subjects formerly 
governed by the (soon-to-be-illegal) collective bargaining agreement. Subsequent 
trainings were delivered to help constituents understand the process being utilized as 
well. When I entered the room to begin one such subsequent training, it was to a grim-
faced group with negative body language. One participant stood out in particular, given 
that she had crossed out her pre-printed nametag and hand-written the alias “NORMA” 
on it in large block letters, evoking Sally Field’s iconic character in the 1979 film Norma 
Rae, a touchstone among labor organizers for its gritty portrayal of a young woman’s 
courageous efforts to unionize the textile mill whose inhumane working conditions led to 
her father’s death. This was not an auspicious sign. 
But within two years, the college would adopt interest-based methods so 
wholeheartedly that it earned a Silver Medal from the International Association of 
Facilitators for developing a program where over 75 staff members have been trained to 
facilitate the resolution of conflicts throughout the organization, from operating the 
shared governance Councils and College Assemblies that address policy at the 
institutional level to working out inter-departmental or inter-office conflicts (Sorensen 
and Fritz 2016). And these types of stories abound throughout institutions that have 
adopted interest-based models, with long histories of contentiousness giving way to 
workable, collective decision-making even on complex issues. This is true even though 
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the history of labor-management relations, like that of politics, is fraught with conflict 
that is sometimes so severe it erupts into physical violence (Chaison 2006; Dray 2011; 
Murold and Chitty 2001).  
In this section, I will examine specific examples of the transformative effect that 
IBN has had on institutions facing significant stresses in the form of market pressure, 
resource scarcity, and legal constraints. In these institutions, IBN has had a “conversion” 
effect, where strong non-believers, raised in and enamored of traditional methods of 
hard bargaining, become passionate converts to IBN. Their stories of the virtues that 
they found in the IBN model, and how it helped them manage situations that challenge 
democratic norms, demonstrate the potential that an examination of interest-based 
methods may have for realizing some of the values of deliberative democracy.  
By beginning my examination with actual implementation of IBN, I join the 
growing ranks of theorists who have expressed concerns that deliberative democratic 
theory suffers from its heavy reliance on abstract principles, remaining “relatively 
unleavened by the direct experience of deliberative practitioners” (Kadlec 2007; 
Mansbridge et al. 2006, 1). After examining that direct experience in some detail and 
concluding that it does suggest possibilities for discourse to address complex and 
controversial policy issues, I return to the underlying theory, beginning with its origins 
in the work of Mary Parker Follett, and explicating the differences between her views of 
collective problem-solving and those that underlie the deliberative models discussed 
above. I also lay out the specific mechanics of integrative problem-solving based on 
Follett’s theories, as it has developed and been implemented building on Follett’s 
foundational work.   
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Chapter Three 
 
IBN as Cultural Change: Madison and Maricopa 
 
Deliberative democracy would seem to be a natural fit in higher education, given 
that institutions of higher education have long committed to the principle of shared 
governance, in which faculty are recognized as having unique capacity and responsibility 
to be involved in decisions regarding the institution’s educational mission and 
operational decisions that affect that mission (AAUP 1966; Miller and Caplow 2003, 3; 
Mortimer and Sathre 2007, 25). But translating principle into practice can be 
challenging, and higher education institutions are not immune from cycles of conflict. 
Here I will examine the experience of two such institutions who recently adopted 
interest-based problem-solving in order to further their commitment to shared 
governance: Madison Area Technical College and the Maricopa Community College 
District. Both institutions turned to IBN in response to crises that rendered their prior 
methods of structuring interactions between the competing (and often complex) 
constituencies of administration, faculty, and staff unworkable. Both institutions found 
that interest-based models provided a path through conflicts they were otherwise unable 
to solve and changed their institutional culture in ways that supported greater 
collaboration. 
Origins in a Time of Crisis 
The circumstances that engendered interest in interest-based methods differed 
between the two institutions, but both institutions faced a breaking point that rendered 
their prior method of negotiation unworkable.  
Madison’s circumstances are discussed above. Decades of bargaining practices 
were swept away by state legislation (referred to as Act 10) making public-union 
negotiation largely impermissible, leaving the college with significant gaps in its policies 
regarding the matters that had once been addressed by now-defunct collective 
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bargaining agreements, with no established procedure for replacing them. Relationships 
between the unions and the administration had been contentious, and there had been 
conflicts between the unions representing different employee groups, but everyone 
involved was familiar with the existing system and it provided a sense of stability 
(Sorensen and Fritz 2015, 3). 
The legislative and judicial battle over the legitimacy of Act 10 had also 
heightened conflicts between management and labor, increasing distrust. Many 
individuals on both sides advocated further escalation of the conflict, whether through 
the administration unilaterally imposing new policies or the union members resisting 
administration authority. The college also had to plan for a $2 million deficit, and 
rumors of drastic actions such as pay reductions and layoffs were rife. 
At Maricopa, there was no precipitating legal change. Unlike Wisconsin, Arizona 
law does not expressly permit public-sector collective bargaining, and the 
administration’s historical practices of consulting with faculty and employee 
representatives in “meet and confer” sessions are a creature of tradition and agreement, 
rather than statutory requirement. For many years, the relationship between the Faculty 
Association and the administration, at the bargaining table, had been a combative and 
distrustful one. Each side would come to the negotiation with demands, dig into its own 
positions, and give little if any ground in the negotiation sessions. We always ended with 
a contract, but both sides were frustrated. 
Then, in April 2010, several members of the faculty came to the leadership of the 
Faculty Association with information that, they contended, showed financial 
improprieties by the District’s Chancellor. These faculty urged the leadership to present 
the information directly to the District’s Governing Board during the time set aside at the 
Board’s public meeting for a report of the Association. We considered doing so, but in the 
end concluded that the argument was too weak, taking such an explosive step in public 
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was too likely to backfire for the institution as a whole, and doing so would further 
damage our already tattered working relationship with the administration. The Faculty 
Association leadership and the faculty who developed the case for financial impropriety 
ultimately therefore met with the Chancellor and his budget staff to present the 
information in a private meeting. 
At the conclusion of a tense interaction during which his staff explained how the 
faculty had reached incorrect conclusions based on incomplete information, he asked, in 
frustration, why we had not just asked for the information we needed so that we could do 
the analysis correctly. I was present in my capacity as the incoming Faculty Association 
President Elect, as well as the chair of the Faculty Association’s team for the negotiating 
process, and my response was based on my knowledge of that process. Given the 
treatment we received at the negotiating table when we pressed the administration team 
for information, I told the Chancellor that we had no reason to believe that any requests 
for information would get a positive response in any other context. 
Motivation for the Turn to IBN 
A different Chancellor might have responded to my observation with anger, and 
this Chancellor was already visibly distressed at the accusations of the faculty we had 
shared with him. But to his credit, his response was, “What can we do to change this 
relationship?” That question prompted the Faculty Association’s research into 
techniques to deescalate bargaining conflict and strengthen labor-management working 
relationships and led us to IBN.  
At Madison, the suggestion to use IBN methods was similarly motivated. It came 
from the college’s new president, who had worked with those methods in his prior 
institutions and who believed that they could provide a productive model to fill the gap 
created by the legal change. President Daniels is also a strong proponent of IBN because 
he believes it increases responsibility and productivity, as reflected in his many public 
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statements at the college in support of it. Currently, Madison’s interest-based problem-
solving (IBPS) program website leads with the following quote explaining the 
institution’s commitment: 
Interest-Based Problem Solving is a shift from an 
authoritative posture to one of shared authority and 
responsibility – up and down throughout this organization. 
I believe this makes us stronger . . . and I believe it is the 
right thing to do. 
 
- Dr. Jack E. Daniels III, Madison College President 
(Madison Area Technical College). 
 
The Initial Step: Training 
As this was a new process for both institutions, both began by training the 
participants in IBN theory and methodology. Maricopa engaged the Cornell University 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations to train both its administration and faculty 
bargaining teams in the summer of 2010, with the goal of using IBN at the negotiating 
table beginning in fall of 2010.  
At Madison, the administration envisioned designing a new process of shared 
governance that brought together representatives of all employee unions, a significant 
change from the prior practice of negotiating with each group separately (Sorensen and 
Fritz 2015, 3-4). Given the number of people who had to be trained and the need to get 
policies in place quickly to replace the bargaining agreements, the College embarked on 
an aggressive schedule of training, beginning with selected leaders from the 
administration and each employee group in October of 2013 and continuing into the 
spring of 2013.  
Initial Implementation 
At both institutions, the lessons learned in training were put into effect almost 
immediately. 
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At Maricopa, the first IBN-method negotiations began in the fall of 2010, directly 
following the summer training sessions for both teams. An outside facilitator with 
expertise in the interest-based negotiation process was hired to facilitate all of the 
negotiating sessions. This decision was made in part out of recognition that the process 
was new and that we were likely to need reminders and coaching regarding how to use it. 
It was also due to concerns that an outside process observer could be needed to check 
any attempts by individuals on the administration team, who formally outrank members 
of the faculty team, to assert prerogatives at the negotiation table based on their status or 
institutional power. 
For the first year, the team decided jointly to focus on low-stakes issues in order 
to focus on practicing IBN methods and building the working relationship that would 
sustain us in tackling higher-stakes issues in future cycles. Although the process was not 
without conflict or frustrations, the negotiation process resulted in a number of creative 
solutions made possible by the sharing of information, where one side would raise a 
concern or problem and the other would contribute knowledge that led to an effective 
solution that had not previously been considered. 
Madison also began using IBN almost immediately, but in a much more 
challenging set of circumstances. Most institutions negotiating policies start from some 
existing framework that they are seeking to revise or improve, as we did in Maricopa, but 
the change in Wisconsin law had effectively discarded previous policies to the extent 
those were covered by the previously comprehensive collective bargaining agreements. 
Madison did not have the luxury of focusing on low-stakes issues to ease into the new 
process, nor did it have an existing negotiating entity that could be converted to an 
interest-based methodology. And like most complex institutions, Madison’s internal 
constituencies did not fall neatly into two sides representing labor and management, but 
into a whole host of different constituencies with different perspectives and priorities, 
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including senior administration, middle managers, administrative support staff, tenure-
track faculty, and adjunct faculty as well as constituencies defined by function, such as 
human resources and information technology. The diversity of these perspectives meant 
that individuals who one might expect to agree, or who even might have been 
represented by the same union, found themselves at odds in the negotiations in ways 
that even they sometimes found surprising. Moreover, the options available to resolve 
the competing perspectives had to fit within the College’s increasingly scarce financial 
resources.  
Madison addressed this challenge by appointing a twelve-member task force to 
examine shared governance models at other colleges and by developing a structure for 
shared governance at Madison (Sorensen and Fritz 2015, 4-5). The task force designed a 
system that combined institutional-level collaboration and more focused working 
groups. An elected College Assembly is charged with “managing the Shared Governance 
system and making policy recommendations to the college president.” The College 
Assembly takes input from seven councils made up of Assembly members and others 
which work on issues in their substantive area: academics, student affairs, information 
technology, diversity and community relations, facilities planning and investment, fiscal 
management and organizational effectiveness, and employee relations and professional 
development. Elections for the new council were held in September 2014, and it began 
its work in January 2015, distributing to the councils prioritized lists of issues with the 
goal of developing recommendations for comprehensive institutional policies by the end 
of the spring semester in that year. Websites were established to keep the college 
informed about what issues each council was working on, and, through many hours of 
hard work, the college managed to get basic policies in place by its deadline.  
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Institutionalization and Spread of IBN Methodology 
At Maricopa, building on the success of the initial training year of IBN, the 
administration and faculty have continued to use facilitated, interest-based negotiation 
to conduct their “meet and confer” process. In the intervening years, using that process, 
the team has resolved contentious issues relating to faculty pay, the use of adjunct 
faculty, and peer review of tenure-track faculty. As a result of those negotiations, the 
Maricopa administration agreed to fix inversion of faculty salaries resulting from 
multiple years of salary freezes and to guarantee that 60% of credits will be taught by 
full-time faculty, while the faculty developed and implemented Peer Assistance and 
Review Committees to provide for peer review of tenure-track faculty during their 
developmental years. 
Meanwhile, the Maricopa staff, who conducted their “meet and confer” in 
separate processes for each staff subgroup, began to express interest in the new process 
being used by the faculty, and asked if they could use it. Notably, they were willing to use 
me (a faculty member and leader of the Faculty Association) as a trainer and facilitator 
for their process, even though relationships between faculty and staff in Maricopa are 
also historically contentious. This openness to change and faculty involvement 
demonstrated a willingness to form new, cooperative relationships that carried forward 
into the implementation of IBN in the staff “meet and confer” process. Like the Assembly 
Madison created to address the legislative elimination of its prior bargaining structure, 
the staff “meet and confer” process brings together employee representatives from a 
broad range of job functions within the institution (with the exception of faculty, who 
continue to have a separate process), providing both opportunities to address mutual 
concerns and the need to juggle numerous perspectives and experiences rather than a 
clear cut duality of options. 
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In the intervening years, Maricopa has expanded use of IBN outside of the 
bargaining context to conflict management more widely. Maricopa’s existing internal 
mediation services have been increased and are conducted by trained mediators using 
interest-based conflict resolution techniques, while over 1,000 employees have gone 
through some form of interest-based negotiation training. Most of those employees have 
no formal involvement with either the faculty or the staff meet and confer processes, but 
have participated in the training so that they can use interest-based methods to resolve 
conflicts in their daily activities. The prevalence of this training has affected everyday 
conversation around Maricopa, with people defaulting to a discussion of interests and 
possibilities when they are confronted with a problem to be resolved. 
Madison has taken even more steps to institutionalize interest-based principles 
throughout the College. The College has continued to conduct trainings, with the goal of 
having all administrators, staff, and faculty completing at least basic training in interest-
based problem-solving (Sorensen and Fritz 2016, 3-4). A more extensive three-hour 
training is also available, and any interested person can go through a two-day training on 
facilitation of interest-based problem-solving. Over 75 staff members have gone through 
the two-day facilitator training. The proliferation of facilitators means that Madison has 
many trained individuals who are used not only in the formal shared governance process 
but are also called in to assist departments throughout the campus in resolving issues as 
they arise. Departments have used interest-based processes to reach decisions on a 
variety of operational issues including facilities and budget planning, scheduling classes, 
selecting distance education tools, and setting recruiting priorities (Sorensen and Fritz 
2016, 4). Trained facilitators are often used to lead these sessions so that the 
department’s manager can participate in the process along with other department 
members. 
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Madison has established an internal structure to maintain and support its shared 
governance and facilitation programs. The College’s IBPS Director serves as the 
coordinator and works with a core group of IBPS fellows (administrators, faculty, and 
staff who dedicate four to ten hours per month) who serve as lead facilitators (Sorensen 
and Fritz 2016, 4-5). Together, these experienced facilitators provide the majority of the 
trainings and facilitate shared governance meetings. Of the seven councils reporting to 
the College Assembly, five are facilitated on a regular basis. 
Madison is now working on a system of awarding badges to facilitators to reflect 
their level of experience, with level one corresponding to completion of the training and 
levels two and three reflecting on experience in conducting facilitations (Sorensen and 
Fritz 2016, 4). In 2016, Madison received a Silver Medal from the International 
Association of Facilitators for its efforts in developing and implementing facilitation 
throughout its campuses. 
Assessment of the IBN Model. Although both institutions report positive 
outcomes from their IBN experiences, they acknowledge that implementation has not 
been without its difficulties. Participants at Madison have noted the significant time that 
has been consumed by the process, both in terms of the training and in terms of the 
decision-making itself (Sorensen and Fritz 2016, 5; Sorensen and Fritz 2015, 4). Even 
with reminders that sometimes you must “go slow to go fast,” participants can become 
frustrated and must persist in order to reach results (Sibbet 2008, 37; Sorensen and 
Fritz 2015, 4). Progress has been slower on larger, more complex policy issues as 
opposed to intra-department conflicts, increasing the need for leaders in all groups to 
communicate and demonstrate their ongoing commitment to the new process. People 
who are invested in the old system also have opportunities for sabotage, and leaders and 
facilitators have had to learn how to guard against saboteurs and keep them from 
derailing more productive efforts. 
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Maricopa’s adoption of interest-based negotiation in its faculty “meet and confer” 
process was the subject of a formal study using both survey and interview data gathered 
from participants (Brown 2015). That study found that use of interest-based techniques 
had positively influenced both the relationship between administration and faculty and 
the substantive outcome of the issues negotiated (115). Participants also noted the spread 
to positive effect of interest-based principles throughout the organization beyond the 
bargaining context. However, administrators demonstrated less enthusiasm for adopting 
the new process, reflected in some conduct where they (1) sought to use interest-based 
language to pursue positions in the same way they would have in traditional bargaining, 
(2) demonstrated reduced understanding of IBN methods, and (3) engaged in less pre-
session preparation that limited the substantive work that could be done (109-10). 
Members of the administrative team also seemed to struggle more than faculty in 
seeking input and sharing proposals with their constituents, leading to changes in their 
views from one meeting to another (101-02). Interestingly, even though preparation and 
commitment to the process appeared to differ somewhat between the two groups, both 
still reported satisfaction with the substantive outcomes and effect on working 
relationships, suggesting that IBN methods may be able to make a difference even in 
non-ideal deliberative circumstances. 
Future of IBN. Both Madison and Maricopa are still relatively new to the 
implementation of IBN, with the methodology slowly working its way into both 
institutional culture and decision-making processes. Each institution has noted instances 
where a lack of commitment or active opposition could stymie implementation, as in 
Madison’s experiences with potential saboteurs and Maricopa’s differing levels of 
preparation between administrative and faculty teams. Nor has implementation of IBN 
erased all conflict, as in a recent incident in Maricopa with employee representatives of 
the newly created staff council. These representatives were sufficiently concerned with 
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the behavior of some of their administrative counterparts that they spoke publicly about 
those concerns to the District’s governing board, resulting in an independent 
investigation that recommended changes in the administration’s relationship with 
employees and commitment to the established negotiation process (Jones 2017; Ryman 
2017).  
If IBN is to have insights useful to deliberation in the political sphere, then, the 
question arises whether it is viable as a longer-term approach and, if so, how that 
approach develops and solidifies. In the next chapter, I turn to a more mature IBN 
experiment in the labor-management context, one that has been ongoing in the 
healthcare field for more than twenty years.   
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Chapter Four 
The Long-Term Project:  
IBN at Kaiser Permanente 
Perhaps the most well-known and thoroughly documented instance of IBN in the 
labor-management context is the Kaiser Permanente Labor-Management Partnership, 
which began more than twenty years ago. The partnership arose in a time of significant 
internal conflict and outside stress and has endured through numerous changes in the 
health care industry as well as multiple cycles. Its persistence and adaptability stand as a 
testament to the transformative power of IBN. 
Origins in a Time of Stress 
In December 1995, union leaders representing a coalition of twenty-seven unions 
and 55,000 workers traveled to the Dallas airport for an off-the-record meeting, 
facilitated by expert mediator John Calhoun Wells, with Kaiser Permanente CEO Dr. 
David Lawrence (Kochan et al. 2009, 2-3). Both sides were facing considerable 
difficulties. Kaiser, then the nation’s leading health-maintenance organization, was 
losing more than $250 million and had been advised to divide into smaller entities and 
adopt cost control measures similar to that of its competitors. Its initial efforts to 
implement cost cutting measures had included adopting a tougher stance in negotiations 
with its unions (Kochan et al. 2009, 2, 34). Union members were increasingly concerned 
with the escalating conflict between labor and management and declines in patient care 
and employee morale, but were simultaneously worried that escalating the conflict would 
be to the long-term detriment of both their members and the labor movement generally 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 3, 34-35; McKersie, Eaton, and Kochan 2004, 15-17).  
The union coalition developed a two-phase strategy (Kochan et al. 2009, 37). 
They were aware of the dire predictions and recommendations made by the management 
consultant and eager to present an alternative model of doing business that would 
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address Kaiser’s financial concerns while addressing employees’ concerns about working 
conditions and patient care. If they could succeed in convincing Kaiser, it would have 
positive effects not just for their Kaiser-employed members, but for other members in 
the industry, by providing an alternative to the “non-union, low wage” model being 
advocated by the management consultants on an industry-wide basis. But the unions 
also developed a “Plan B”: a public campaign based on the data they had gathered 
regarding the declines in patient care resulting from Kaiser’s proposed approach, which 
they would wage during the negotiation sessions in order to increase their bargaining 
power. The problem with Plan B, they realized, was that it could do “permanent damage” 
to Kaiser and thereby to members’ employment prospects.  
Kaiser management perceived the crisis as similarly serious and destructive 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 38-39; McKersie, Eaton, and Kochan 2004, 16). They understood 
that the unions were concerned enough about recent changes to be willing to confront 
management and that the possibility of public campaigns or strikes would do significant 
damage to an organization that was already experiencing economic difficulties. Leaders 
of Kaiser’s medical groups were also concerned about the disruptive effect that strikes or 
lockouts might have on medical care. 
Interviewed after the fact, leaders of both organizations saw the willingness to 
consider partnership as a reaction to a situation where further conflict was perceived as 
doing damage to both sides: 
John Sweeney  
 
What happens? A huge labor-management crisis is created. 
Suddenly there are 30,000 AFL-CIO members with open 
contracts in the HMO that labor built. We offer a strategic 
partnership to CEO David Lawrence to try and end the 
crisis before it gets out of hand. 
 
After weeks of turmoil, we were not only successful in 
getting the contracts settled, but our offer to form a 
partnership was accepted. So sometimes out of crisis and 
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determined effort comes a willingness to try a better 
alternative. 
 
David Lawrence 
 
I was willing to try anything at that point because it was 
clear that the path we were on . . . was a dead end. We were 
going to be facing labor strife in every corner of our 
organization. We had 54 labor contracts, 36 unions, and if 
they go south on us, we have a crisis on our hands – at the 
same time we were in a fair amount of conflict between the 
Medical Groups and the Health Plan – what I saw was an 
organization that was starting to balkanize in very serious 
ways. A lot of this was being driven by external things and 
a lot of it was being driven by changes we were trying to 
make in the organization at a strategic level. 
 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 39).  
Development of a Partnership 
Having arranged both the off-the-record meeting and the assistance of a 
prominent mediator, the labor leaders prepared to deliver a strong message regarding 
their concerns, hoping that they would be able to avoid the mutually assured destruction 
of their Plan B (Kochan et al. 2009, 2-3). To their surprise, Kaiser’s CEO began the 
meeting not with an aggressive stance of his own, but by frankly laying out his own 
concerns regarding patient care and increasing internal conflict (Ibid.; McKersie, Eaton, 
and Kochan 2004, 16-17). Once the two sides realized that their interests were almost 
completely aligned, an opportunity to transform labor-management relations was 
revealed. 
But even with this promising beginning, making the partnership a reality was not 
a straightforward project. Kaiser is a very complex organization, comprised of a 
partnership between the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Hospitals, a non-profit that 
operates a health maintenance organization and twenty-nine medical centers, and 
several Permanente Medical Groups, for-profit corporations employing more than 
13,000 physicians and other health care providers (Kochan et al. 2009, 27-28; McKersie, 
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Eaton, and Kochan 2004, 14-15). The affiliated organizations operate in eight regions 
spanning from Hawaii to the Mid-Atlantic, with nearly 10 million overall members. Over 
100,000 of Kaiser’s approximately 130,000 workers are represented by more than two 
dozen different union chapters representing not just different geographic areas but 
different categories of employees (Kochan et al. 2009, 30-33). 
And although both sides agreed that a partnership approach was wise and 
desirable, that did not mean they were in agreement about how the partnership should 
work or what it would do. Labor-management partnerships, historically, have taken 
multiple forms (Kochan et al. 2009, 17-18). They may address issues of workplace 
administration, such as cooperating on efforts to “improve productivity, product or 
service quality, and worker satisfaction.” They may focus on the negotiation process by 
incorporating problem-solving techniques into the negotiation of agreements or in 
resolving internal disputes in a manner other than the filing of formal grievances. Some 
partnerships move beyond the traditional subjects of bargaining to provide mechanisms 
for union leaders to give input into managerial decisions. 
Kaiser’s union leaders wanted the latter model, with “consensus decision-making 
at all levels up and down the organization” (Kochan et al. 2009, 41). National 
management, eager to avoid the negative consequences of escalating conflict, were 
interested in a more cooperative relationship. But managers of the medical groups, with 
whom Kaiser was already in an ongoing conflict, were skeptical of consensus decision-
making and suspicious that they were being asked to partner with the unions to calm 
down labor-management relations so that Kaiser could focus on prevailing in its conflicts 
with the medical groups. Union members were also skeptical, particularly given that the 
contracts that were finalized in the wake of the 1995 decision to pursue partnership had 
significant concessions to management (Kochan et al. 2009, 39).  
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Indeed, some unions representing about 15% of Kaiser’s unionized workforce 
refused to participate in the Labor-Management Partnership at all (Kochan et al. 2009, 
30, 33, 43-45). One significant union, the California Nurses Association, went so far as to 
stage a one-day strike and issue an eleven-page public statement critiquing the 
Partnership as a surrender of union authority in exchange for little if any meaningful 
participation in management decision-making (Kochan et al. 2009, 43-44). 
The Partnership Agreement. Ultimately, negotiating and executing an actual 
partnership agreement took the next year and a half and the active assistance of a 
consulting firm with experience in facilitating labor-management partnerships (Kochan 
et al. 2009, 40). The lead facilitator was John Stepp, whose background included service 
as a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service mediator and head of the U.S. Labor 
Department’s Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs. Stepp 
and his team worked with labor and management leaders to develop a written agreement 
that specified the purpose of the partnership and how it would operate (Kochan et al. 
2009, 40-42, 45-47). The agreement they ultimately reached reflected the organizational 
complexity of Kaiser. A National Labor-Management Partnership Strategy Group is 
comprised of representatives of management and the union coalition overseeing working 
groups in six specific substantive areas (structure, performance sharing, education, 
benefits, subcontracting, and workplace safety). Regional partnership teams, in turn 
oversee service area or facility teams for the providers in their region (Kochan et al. 
2009, 45-47; Lazes, Katz, and Figueroa 2012, 6-7).  
The partnership was empowered to address a broad scope of issues beyond what 
might fall within a bargaining agreement, expressly including “strategic initiatives; 
quality; member and employee satisfaction; business planning; and business unit 
employment issues” (Kochan et al. 2009, 46). Consultation was required if “constituent 
or institutional interests are even marginally affected,” with mere informing to be used 
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only “[i]f one party has little, if any interest in the outcome, and no particular expertise 
on an issue to be decided.” Where either party’s “vital interests” were likely to be 
affected, consensus decision-making was to be used. If consensus could not be reached, 
the parties reserved their rights to use the tools they had available prior to the 
partnership agreement: on mandatory subjects of bargaining, contractual and legal 
rights would govern; while on non-mandatory subjects, management would have the 
authority to make a final decision. 
The partnership agreement also expressly acknowledged the interests that had 
motivated the parties’ interests in partnership, including provisions governing 
“employment and union security,” cooperation in Kaiser’s efforts to market itself to new 
members, and the protection of proprietary information shared in partnership 
interactions (Kochan et al. 2009, 46). With these partnership strategies, the agreement 
articulated ambitious purposes that it hoped to achieve for both labor and management: 
• Improve the quality of health care for Kaiser Permanente members and 
the communities served. 
• Assist Kaiser Permanente in achieving and maintaining market leading 
competitive performance. 
• Make Kaiser Permanente a better place to work. 
• Expand Kaiser Permanente’s members in current and new markets, 
including designation as a provider of choice for all labor organizations in 
the areas served. 
• Provide Kaiser Permanente employees with the maximum possible 
employment and income security within Kaiser Permanente and/or the 
health care field. 
• Involve employees and their unions in decisions. 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 46). In 2002, the agreement was amended to add an additional 
goal: “to consult on public policy issues and jointly advocate when possible and 
appropriate” (Kochan et al. 2009, 45). 
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Once the leaders signed off on the terms of the agreement, it was submitted to the 
membership of the twenty-seven participating unions for a vote. After an educational 
campaign to inform front-line workers about what the partnership was intended to do, it 
was approved by 90 percent of members, with a 70 percent election turnout (Kochan et 
al. 2009, 42). 
Initial Implementation: The Transition 
Recognizing that full implementation of the partnership agreement would not 
happen overnight, the parties developed a “Pathways to Partnership” plan calling for 
staged progress toward the goal of participatory decision-making. The plan called for 
gradual efforts at capacity building, beginning with education and training and moving 
into more specific topics such as conflict resolution and business education. It also 
expressly sought to reach an end state where the organization moved from traditional to 
interest-based models for both operational decision-making and any necessary 
negotiation: 
Five Phases of Pathways to Partnership 
Traditional Foundation 
Building 
Transitional I and II Vision 
• Adversarial 
• Rule based 
• Problem settled 
not solved 
• Decision-
making seldom 
shared 
• Education and 
training 
• Issue resolution 
• Establish teams 
• Involve 
employees and 
physicians in 
decisions 
• Input into 
decision-making 
• Trained in 
conflict 
resolution 
• Collective 
bargaining 
• Business 
education 
• All employees 
and physicians 
with full 
understanding 
of the business 
• Union 
leadership 
integrated into 
decision-making 
• Interest-based 
bargaining 
• Accountable 
teams 
• Consensus 
decision-making 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 48). 
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While this gradual approach was being implemented throughout the sprawling 
and complex organization, the newly formed partnership also sought opportunities to 
put partnership principles into practice in response to specific, discrete problems 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 51). By doing so, the partnership hoped to rack up some “early 
wins” that could bolster support for the program more generally. Two situations 
provided such an opportunity.  
In early 1998, Kaiser found itself in the position of needing to open a new 
hospital in Southern California, a process that would ordinarily take about two years 
from initial planning to opening the doors to patients (Kochan et al. 2009, 55-56). The 
partnership agreed to delegate the planning of the new facility to a “joint task team” 
composed of doctors, nurses, technicians, managers, and other employees, and to retain 
the consultants who had assisted in developing the partnership agreement to facilitate 
the project. The process began by training participants in problem-solving and 
consensus decision-making and taking them on site visits to other organizations using 
various models of cooperative management. Participants then held five days of intensive 
discussions, involving 100 people, regarding how to design the flow of work within the 
hospital. They then divided into “SWAT” teams assigned to specific processes like 
technology or vendor contracting. After only eight months, the joint task team delivered 
a functioning hospital, under budget (Kochan et al. 2009, 57). The hospital itself, which 
was designed with a focus on making patient care more efficient and coordinated, not 
only experienced high levels of patient satisfaction but required fewer nursing hours per 
patient-day compared to other Kaiser hospitals in the area.  
At around the same time, the partnership identified another situation that would 
test the durability of the partnership’s commitment to employment security. A 
consultant had recommended closure of one of Kaiser’s optical laboratories, for an 
annual savings of $800,000 (Kochan et al. 2009, 57-61). Kaiser began negotiating with 
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the union with an eye toward negotiating an orderly shutdown of the lab, but union 
leaders rejected that approach entirely. Recognizing that they were headed to impasse, 
both sides requested and obtained permission from their principals to try an interest-
based approach and brought in a facilitator from Kaiser’s interest-based consulting 
group. The facilitator guided participants in shifting their inquiry from whether the lab 
should be kept open to the broader topic of how the performance of the lab could be 
improved. The facilitator then asked each side to discuss its interests and return to share 
those interests with the larger group. When the groups heard each other’s reports, they 
began to understand that they were not as far apart as they originally realized. In the 
words of the key management decision maker, who had not been a proponent of the 
partnership given the contentious history of labor in his area: 
We realized that there was really 80 percent or 90 percent 
overlap in interests. The differences were all in how we 
might get there. This was based on the employment 
security agreement. We had agreed to full employment 
security, no layoffs, but we could retrain or move people. 
When we got into the third and fourth days, we began to 
craft some options. That was when we began to ask, what 
could solve the problem? The dynamics in the room were 
changing by then. We had come in on opposite sides of the 
table, and by this time we were sitting at mixed tables. The 
relationships were beginning to form. 
 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 59). The joint sessions ultimately generated a list of 250 possible 
ideas for improvement in operations, and after several more days of facilitated 
negotiations, participants developed a plan to reorganize the lab for an 18-month trial 
period, with revenue and cost targets. Union participants, who were now receiving 
detailed financial information for the same time, took finance classes to increase their 
understanding of how the business worked so that they could participate actively in 
setting and meeting performance goals (Kochan et al. 2009, 60-61). Within a year, the 
lab’s gross revenues had increased by 9.8 percent and productivity increased by 8 
percent. Employees had received a 2.7 percent payout from an incentive plan built into 
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the reorganization. Nearly 10 years later, the facility that had been slated for closure had 
been profitable in every year except the one in which profits were reinvested to expand 
optical lab operations in the area. And its managers found themselves with a new 
appreciation for how much union members knew about the business and how that 
knowledge could be put to good use if opportunities for input were provided: 
[The operations of the lab are] very performance focused. I 
was impressed, and am still impressed, by how much labor 
knew about the business. They were never allowed to 
engage fully in improving the business. . . . They had ideas, 
but before, they never surfaced, or if they did, they never 
went anywhere. It was a learning process for me to engage 
a knowledgeable workforce, and it was possible because 
management was ready to listen. 
 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 61). 
Expansion of the Partnership 
As the Kaiser Labor-Management Partnership built up early wins, it made a 
concentrated effort to build on those wins, establishing a database of project successes 
that were available to all of its local teams as examples and sources of ideas (Kochan et 
al. 2009, 61-63). The partnership also increased staff support for the partnership, with a 
particular focus on training modules including an orientation to the partnership, specific 
training on interest-based problem-solving methods, and business and leadership 
training to assist employees who were being invited to have greater involvement in those 
areas.  
But diffusion throughout the entire organization was a slow process, with the use 
of trial projects meaning, as a practical matter, that some sites had significant experience 
while others had little or no partnership-related experiences. As the partnership 
developed, it became clear that it made its greatest inroads into institutional culture by 
being ready to address institutional challenges as they arose (Kochan et al. 2009, 68-72). 
By addressing crisis situations, the partnership gave concrete demonstrations of its value 
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and won over both the reluctant and the unaware. But Kaiser struggled with turning 
these successes into an overall transformation of institutional culture, such that even 
regions or units that had seen successes using partnership methods swing back to 
adversarial relationships between management and employees. 
The negotiation of new national employment agreements in 2000 and 2005 
provided Kaiser with an opportunity to address these concerns and attempt to embed 
partnership principles more deeply (Kochan et al. 2009, 88-120). In 2000, the parties 
began by training each side’s representatives in the principles and methods of IBN. They 
then deployed neutral facilitators to assist with bargaining itself. In both 2000 and 2005, 
rather than beginning with a traditional joint session in which each side presented its 
proposed positions, the parties began by establishing joint task groups to address 
different topics that were anticipated as part of the negotiation (Kochan et al. 2009, 90-
95, 102-08; McKersie, Eaton, and Kochan 2004, 23). Each task force was assigned to 
investigate and make recommendations to a centralized “common issues committee” 
composed of labor and management representatives. Facilitators intervened when the 
parties got stuck, reiterating the IBN methodology of identifying interests and generating 
options (Ibid.; McKersie et al. 2008, 73-78). When the task forces had completed their 
work, they reported back to the common issues committee, which used a combination of 
IBN and traditional bargaining methodologies to finalize new national agreements 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 92, 110-17; McKersie et al. 2008, 78-87; McKersie, Eaton, and 
Kochan 2004, 22-23). Both agreements included provisions intended to strengthen and 
expand the labor-management partnership, as well as provisions addressing labor and 
management interests in wages, benefits, and administration. Although both 
negotiations included instances of frustration and conflict, each concluded in a national 
contract ratified by union members. Participants in both sessions expressed satisfaction 
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that partnership principles had been used and working relationships strengthened 
(Kochan et al. 2009, 117-19; McKersie et al. 2008, 75, 89). 
Following the 2005 negotiations, Kaiser has focused on spreading the effect of its 
commitment to partnership through the creation of “unit-based teams” (UBTs) in every 
department of each of its medical centers (Lazes, Katz, and Figueroa 2012, 7-11). Each 
team, composed of all members in a “natural work unit,” is charged with working 
collaboratively on performance and quality to reach Kaiser’s stated goals of being the 
“best place to work, most affordable, best quality, and best service.” Key members of 
management and union leaders are tasked as “sponsors” to provide support and 
mentoring, while team co-leads and members are trained on the goals of the UBT 
program and the methods of interest-based problem-solving and consensus decision-
making. Members also receive specialized training depending on their background, with 
management trained in how to “manage[] in a partnering environment” and employees 
trained on being “effective stakeholder[s].” Teams are evaluated on a “path to 
performance” system that incorporates foundational and transitional phases; the 2010 
national agreement set metrics for increasing the percentage of teams that are high-
performing (level five).  
Challenges of Partnership Participation 
Even among the Kaiser labor and management leaders committed to the 
partnership process, there has been an acknowledgement that partnership is sometimes 
difficult. Taking on new roles in the partnership reduced time available for traditional 
labor advocacy or management tasks, requiring additional resources and personnel to 
take over those tasks (Kochan et al. 2009, 136-40). Both sides also found themselves 
needing significant training in new skills and methods to partner effectively, which 
consumed both time and resources (Kochan et al. 2009, 138-40). Asking experienced 
leaders who were used to representing one “side” to take a partnership approach to 
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issues also required them to navigate often difficult questions of how to balance conflict 
and cooperation, with constituents who were suspicious and prone to criticize actions 
they viewed as getting “too cozy” with the other side (Kochan et al. 2009, 136-37, 141-
42). There are also continuing pockets of resistance, both active and passive, to the full 
implementation of partnership techniques. Perhaps most obvious is the continuing 
refusal of one of Kaiser’s largest individual unions, a nurses union in California, to 
participate in the partnership based on its philosophy regarding labor-management 
relations. This union has publicly critiqued the partnership process and attempted to 
recruit members away from participating unions; its refusal to participate has also 
limited the effectiveness of UBTs at the facilities where its nurses work (Kochan et al. 
2009, 43-44, 99, 128-29, 147-48; Lazes, Katz, and Figueroa 2012, 20). Subsequent 
disputes within the SEIU, which represented some 60,000 Kaiser employees, led to 
litigation against Kaiser by dissident union leaders (Eaton and Kochan 2014, 304-05). 
Kaiser chose to handle conflict negotiations with this union more formally, in order to 
manage its litigation risk, but other aspects of the partnership, and particularly the 
UBTs, were by then so pervasive and popular that they could be maintained even in a 
more acrimonious and litigious setting (Eaton and Kochan 2014, 306-07). 
Outcomes Associated with the Partnership Approach 
As in the early successes described in some detail above, Kaiser has found the 
partnership approach to be particularly effective in addressing specific problems. The 
UBT approach adopted in the 2005 agreement has spread this effect more broadly 
throughout the organization by requiring every unit to spend time consciously 
considering its unique challenges and using IBN strategies to address those challenges. 
In particular, units that have fully implemented UBTs have adopted projects that cut 
costs and improve quality of care by tapping the experiential knowledge of their front-
line employees (Lazes, Katz, and Figueroa 2012, 31). The UBT approach plays into 
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Kaiser’s existing culture of diffuse management and decision-making by units that view 
themselves as unique, while providing opportunities for the generation of new ideas. A 
2012 survey of UBTs at two Kaiser facilities demonstrates the variety of practical, and 
effective, improvements generated by UBTs: replacing slippery flooring that caused 
injuries, buying timers for centrifuges to reduce over processing of samples, changing 
how often and for what public announcements were broadcast throughout the hospital, 
and streamlining lists of upcoming discharges to focus on those occurring soonest 
(Lazes, Katz, and Figueroa 2012, 12-30). Kaiser has also established mechanisms for 
UBTs to share their successes through a “UBT tracker” that other teams can access to 
generate ideas they could implement (Lazes, Katz, and Figueroa 2012, 31). 
Implementing collaboration as a regular part of facility management has had a 
positive impact on both labor-management relations and patient care (Lazes, Katz, and 
Figueroa 2012, 12-30). Kaiser’s financial performance has improved steadily since its 
adoption of the partnership, despite the economic challenges it was facing when it 
embarked on the partnership approach (Kochan et al. 2009, 214). Kaiser was recently 
able to use IBN to negotiate complex pension funding issues in a way that satisfied 
employees and reduced costs (Eaton and Kochan 2014, 305-06). Kaiser managers report 
less conflict on union issues because issues are resolved effectively through UBT 
processes (Lazes, Katz, and Figueroa 2012, 32). Employees who are actively involved in 
the Labor-Management Partnership report higher job satisfaction (Kochan et al. 2009, 
224-25).  
And the concrete results appear to reinforce commitment to IBN processes, as 
reflected in the fact that Kaiser has continued to use and expand its partnership 
programs both in daily management and in subsequent rounds of national contracting. 
In contrast to bitter, contentious bargaining sessions, IBN sessions seem to invoke an 
almost religious fervor in participants. Kaiser’s 2000 contract negotiations were likely 
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among the most complex ever attempted in the labor-management context. Given the 
number of constituent groups on both the labor and management side and the 
complexity, difficulty, and importance of the issues, the various task groups who 
reported back to the common issues committee described their meeting presentation as 
“incredibly energizing;” everyone “came away from the session on a real ‘high’” 
(McKersie, Eaton, and Kochan 2004, 26). That high seems to keep those who experience 
it coming back for more.   
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Chapter Five 
 
The Integrative Solution:  
Emphasizing Self-Interest and  
Converting Conflict to Energy 
Based on the foregoing examples, IBN appears to have potential in providing a 
mechanism for disparate groups making up a larger community to come together both to 
resolve particular governance issues and to develop productive working relationships 
that can be used to address future issues. It would seem, then, to provide fertile ground 
for investigation by those who seek to increase productive deliberation on complex and 
contested issues in the political sphere. 
But integrative, interest-based approaches have been largely dismissed in the 
democratic deliberation literature. Perhaps its most prominent detractors are Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, who dismiss integrative possibilities in the legislative 
context in the introduction to their work in The Spirit of Compromise: 
While integrative approaches can be productive, legislative 
opportunities to achieve win-win solutions that serve the 
public without any sacrifice are rarely available. Legislators 
are much more likely to find themselves confronting 
conflicts that cannot be resolved without sacrifice on all 
sides. If they want to make gains over the status quo, they 
will have to give up something of value. They will not have 
the luxury of hoping for the pure win-win solutions that 
some negotiation theorists promise. They will just have to 
compromise (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 16). 
To the extent that Gutmann and Thompson reject integrative models as too optimistic, 
based on the prospect that there will be some “pure win-win solution” that does not 
require sacrifice, they fail to understand correctly either the theory or the method of 
integrative bargaining. What distinguishes integrative bargaining from the distributive 
bargaining that Gutmann and Thompson hope to make more deliberative is a focus on 
transforming the dispute through the dialogue, rather than simply improving the 
manner in which the parties to the negotiation resolve the transaction over which they 
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are bargaining. I now turn to a more thorough explication of the integrative model and 
its theoretical underpinnings, in order to demonstrate that difference.  
Mary Parker Follett and the Goal of Integration 
Biographical Information. Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933) was a political 
theorist, management consultant, and social worker whose thinking on conflict, power, 
and related concepts laid the groundwork for the development of interest-based 
negotiation, as well as the larger field of organizational development (Child 2013, 74-78; 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld 2014, 150-51; Tonn 2003, 1). Follett was born in Quincy, 
Massachusetts and graduated from Radcliffe College. During her time at Radcliffe, 
Follett’s studies ranged widely from law and government, philosophy and humanities, 
and to economics, history, and psychology. Follett studied for a year at Newnham 
College, Cambridge under the private tutelage of Henry Sidgwick in history and political 
theory, and while at Cambridge also wrote The Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
a study of how past Speakers effectively asserted influence and that taught her the value 
of interdisciplinary academic research (Follett 1896; Tonn 2003, 5). 
Reflecting the scope of her educational interests, Follett’s writings and lectures 
ranged widely, and a comprehensive analysis of her corpus would go beyond the scope of 
this study. Instead, I will focus here on her analysis of the main concepts underlying 
interest-based negotiation – conflict, power, and integration. Follett developed her 
foundational statements of these concepts in a series of papers delivered to the Bureau of 
Personnel Administration in January, 1925. 
The Bureau of Personnel Administration Lectures 
Conflict and Integration. Follett’s opening lecture, entitled “Constructive 
Conflict,” reinterprets conflict from being an undesirable and unpleasant circumstance 
to being merely the manifestation of differences among people. Since differences are 
continually and inevitably with us, Follett suggests we ought to seek ways to put conflict 
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to good use. She analogizes conflict to the force of friction in the physical world. The 
mechanical engineer, she notes, generally prefers to minimize friction when possible, but 
also turns friction to his advantage by using it to transmit power through belts and 
pulleys. We, too, she argues, should attempt to make conflict work for us (Follett 1926a, 
30-31). Handled constructively, “[c]onflict as the moment of the appearing and focusing 
of difference may be a sign of health, a prophecy of progress” (Follett 1926a, 34). 
Follett asserts that conflict can be managed either through domination, 
compromise, or integration. Domination, essentially the successful assertion of power 
over another, she dismisses as an effective short-term approach but not only ineffective 
in the long run but also clearly unsatisfactory to the dominated party (Follett 1926a, 31-
35). Her further thoughts on the nature and use of power she saves for her final paper in 
the series and will be discussed in detail below. 
Compromise, though popular, Follett ultimately condemns. The idea that all 
sides should give up something they want for the sake of peace, or of just getting on with 
things, is appealing insofar as it entails in some sense equal sacrifice. However, 
compromise is also troubling because, by definition, we are giving up, at least in part, 
having our desires (or interests) met. This lack of satisfaction of desire she believes 
ultimately will leave parties dissatisfied with the compromise and sows the seeds of 
upheaval at the next opportunity to test, or undermine, the compromise. Neither 
domination nor compromise resolves conflict in a way that creates the possibility for the 
desires of all parties to be met because they do not result in stable solutions (Follett 
1926a, 31-36). 
The third way of resolving conflict, integration, creates new possibilities for 
developing agreements that can satisfy the desires of all parties. Follett illustrates 
integration through numerous examples, of which I will share only two.  
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First is her classic example of the Harvard library window (Follett 1926a, 32). 
Imagine two library patrons sharing a small reading room. One patron wants the window 
open; the other wants it shut. An integrative solution to the conflict would find a way to 
satisfy the desires of both patrons. On the surface, compromise would appear to be the 
only approach given there is no managerial or other power for one patron to assert over 
the other. But what would the compromise be? Open the window only half way? 
Alternate opening and closing the window at regular intervals? These compromises 
merely split the difference and spread the dissatisfaction to both parties. 
An integrative approach “involves invention, and the clever thing is to recognize 
this, and not to let one’s thinking stay within the boundaries of two alternatives which 
are mutually exclusive” (Follett 1926a, 33). In this case, the patrons could agree to open 
the window in the vacant room next door. Why is this not a compromise? Because the 
patrons desired not to have the window opened or closed, per se, but rather, in the case 
of one patron not to have the breeze directly upon her, and in the case of the other patron 
not to have a stuffy room. The parties wanted the window definitively open or closed as 
only a means to satisfying their desires. Both parties’ desires are integrated together 
because they are both satisfied by the agreement. 
Second is her example from the actual experience of a Dairymen’s Co-operative 
League. Workers were required to deliver cans to a creamery platform, and some 
workers had to haul the cans downhill to arrive at the platform and others had to haul 
the cans uphill to unload the cans. The workers argued vehemently about who got to 
unload at the platform first (those hauling uphill or downhill), and as a result of being 
unable to resolve the problem, nearly dissolved the League – a compromise of sorts that 
would clearly fail to satisfy the antecedent interests of the parties in having a League in 
the first place. After bringing in outside assistance, a third-way was discovered – namely, 
to move the platform so as to allow both groups of workers to unload their cans 
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simultaneously. This solution satisfied the underlying desires of the workers, as they 
simply wanted not to have to wait to unload; they did not affirmatively desire to be the 
first to unload (Follett 1926a, 32-33). 
Follett was optimistic about the potential for conflict to be resolved constructively 
through integration, but she was far more pragmatic and practical about conflict than 
idealistic. “I do not say that there is no tragedy in life,” Follett declared, recognizing that 
integration was not always possible. But she did insist that integration was more often 
possible than we might realize and that our penchant for compromise often obscured 
integrative solutions (Follett 1926a, 36). She was also committed to the notion that 
solutions must ultimately pass the test of experience in order to be satisfactory, and so 
we must adopt an experimental mindset in crafting and adopting integrative agreements 
(Follett 1926a, 34). 
Integration: Rules and Roadblocks. Follett’s practical bent is further 
demonstrated by her specific rules for how to bring about integration between parties’ 
interests (Follett 1926a, 36-45). First, she recommends, we must layout the whole 
conflict for all to see, including all of the interests of the parties. This practice results in 
evaluation of the interests by the parties, and this tends to incline parties simultaneously 
to “revaluate” their own interests in light of the totality of interests. This moment of 
revaluation is key to creating an integrative agreement, because this creates the 
opportunity for “the interests to fit into each other,” that is, for us to see our own 
interests in a new light and to value them accordingly (Follett 1926a, 38-39). 
Second, apply the “method of breaking up wholes.” By breaking down complex 
demands into their simplest parts, parties can more easily create integrative solutions 
accommodating those parts that are genuinely desired and not merely linked but 
irrelevant to the interest. Follett provides the example of the boy who claimed to want a 
college education, but upon his father’s death had to work instead. Upon reflection, the 
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boy’s true desire was to get an education simpliciter, not to go to college to get an 
education, so by “breaking up wholes” he was able to see a way to satisfy his true interest 
compatible with his work constraints.  
This method also entails what Follett refers to as “examination of symbols.” 
People entertain expansive concepts that take on symbolic importance to them without 
being defined sufficiently well to understand how the desire can be met. She provides the 
real-life example of a woman who wished she was “going to Europe.” This could 
symbolize any number of desires, none of which necessarily require actually going to 
Europe. Aside from the ambiguity inherent in the phrase (i.e., Is the “going” important? 
Or is experiencing Europe the desire?), what is it about “going to Europe” that is 
desirable? It could be the culture, the people, the food, escape from the monotony, etc. 
Going to Africa or South America could perhaps meet these interests, but we cannot 
know without unpacking what is meant by the symbol. In this case, the woman’s 
underlying desire was discovered to be that she wanted to meet different and interesting 
people, and she was able to accept a local job teaching summer school with interesting 
students and colleagues (Follett 1926a, 40-42). 
Third, and finally, accept “circular response.” One part of circular response is that 
we anticipate the response of other parties and often act in ways to bring about an 
outcome that changes which desires obtain and are therewith integrated. For example, if 
one spouse prefers to go for a drive on Sunday afternoons as a couple, and the other 
spouse prefers to go on a walk, the spouse who prefers to drive might suggest playing 
tennis on Sunday morning so that the spouse who normally prefers walking on Sunday 
afternoon would be fatigued and desire to drive instead. Another part of circular 
response is that we must take steps to prepare the other party to respond in a way 
conducive to reconciliation. Circular response, then, is the recognition that we anticipate 
the responses of others and prepare others to be receptive to our responses. But it is also 
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more. It is the recognition that “I can never fight you, I am always fighting you plus me. I 
have put it this way: that response is always to a relation. I respond not only to you, but 
to the relation between you and me.” This dynamic cannot be avoided and must be 
embraced for conflict to be resolved constructively (Follett 1926a, 42-45).  
Of the various impediments to integration, the first Follett enumerates is that 
“[i]t requires a high order of intelligence, keen perception and discrimination, more than 
all, a brilliant inventiveness.” Another impediment is that Western culture tends to instill 
a taste for dominating others, as the excitement and drama that can entail entices. A 
third impediment is our propensity to argue or agree at a theoretical level without 
ensuing discussion and agreement at the level of concrete action. A fourth impediment is 
our sometimes careless use of language that enflames emotions or generally makes 
parties disagreeable, as demonstrated by the difference between saying “Let’s 
reconsider” instead of “I wish to give you my criticism.” A fifth impediment to 
integration is the inappropriate influence of leaders (whether intended or otherwise). 
Finally, and most important, Follett believed our greatest impediment to integration was 
a lack of training and practice. She insisted, however, that this training must not be to 
instill a virtue of open-mindedness, since for integration to work you must have regard 
both for your own views and for the views of others, and you must truly believe the 
solution you adopt to have integrated the interests. “Mushy people are no more good at 
this than stubborn people,” she observed (Follett 1926a, 45-49). 
Power. Follett’s thoughts on power are found primarily in her lecture by the same 
name, but the foundations for that lecture are presented in the earlier lectures “The 
Giving of Orders” and “Business as an Integrative Unity.” Power, control, and authority, 
Follett suggests, are highly interrelated concepts. Power is merely “the ability to make 
things happen;” control is “power exercised as means toward a specific end;” and 
authority is “vested control.” She cautions that power does not mean strength, as the 
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invalid often exercises power over the household (Follett 1926b; Follett 1926c; Follett 
1926d, 98-99).1  
Power, in and of itself, Follett believes, like conflict, is inherently neither good 
nor bad. Instead, she argues that there are two different types of power, and that one 
works better than the other. When we think of power, it is typically what she refers to as 
power-over, or power exercised to control a person or group. Contrast this against 
power-with, “a jointly developed power, a co-active, not a coercive power.” Power-over 
loses salience when the end one seeks is integration – mutual satisfaction of desires or 
interests – and power-with gains importance (Follett 1926d, 101). Power-with builds as a 
result of circular response, the reality that our actions influence the actions/responses of 
others and that when we respond we do so both to the action and the relationship with 
the person acting (Follett 1926d, 104-07).  
While integration is one means of reducing the influence of power-over, another 
is to rely upon what she terms the law of the situation (Follett 1926c, 58-64; Follett 
1926d, 105-07). In “The Giving of Orders,” Follett notes that when a supervisor gives an 
order to a subordinate, the supervisor often suffers the pushback, resentment, and 
oppositional mindset that follows, and this is counterproductive to the goal meant to be 
achieved by the person in authority. But giving the subordinate no direction is also 
unhelpful. The integrative solution, she suggests, is for the parties to take their orders 
“from the situation” rather than from each other. Parties should approach the situation 
as though it were a problem to be studied and solved by people of equal authority. Then, 
the study of the problem will reveal the “order” inherent in the situation.  
One example she provides is the child who is ordered by his mother to fetch a pail 
of water (for some unnamed purpose, but let us say so that she may use the water in 																																																								
1 This distinction, I believe, forecasts a much later distinction by political scientist 
Joseph Nye differentiating “hard power” from “soft power” (1990). 
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preparing dinner). The child replies that he will not fetch the water, but nevertheless 
rises to retrieve the water anyway. Follett contends the child resists the command from 
his mother, but accedes to the law of the situation (there will not be dinner without 
water). If the mother had, instead of exercising her authority by issuing an order to her 
child, engaged the child as an equal and together discovered that dinner could not be 
prepared without water, and that the mother was engaged in other dinner preparations 
while the child was not, both she and the child would have accepted that the situation 
required him to get the water, and no order was ever issued by one person to another. 
A third way in which Follett believes power-over can be reduced is through the 
use of facts and expertise (Follett 1926d, 105-06). Facts neutralize the power of false 
assumptions and empty fictions and at the same time “reduc[e] the area of irreconcilable 
controversy.” Experts, while not always able to supply facts (as when experts disagree), 
still reduce the scope of irreconcilable controversy for while they may not agree on 
positive facts, they might well agree that certain proposals or options are not possible or 
advisable. 
Finally, power-over can be subdued by making our organizations into “functional 
unities” (Follett 1926c; Follett 1926d, 106-07). By a functional unity Follett means that 
all people within an organization should be empowered to perform their (clearly 
delineated) function and to accept the concomitant authority and responsibility. In this 
way power-with is enhanced, individual capacities are increased, and power-over has 
diminished utility.   
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Chapter Six 
 
From Political Theory to Business Administration:  
The History of Interest-Based Negotiation 
 
Follett herself began the transition from political theorist to “business 
consultant” when she delivered the Bureau of Personnel Administration lectures in 
January, 1925 at the behest of the Bureau’s director, Henry C. Metcalf (Graham 1995, 17-
19). For the next eight years she used her training and insights as a political theorist to 
help businesses driven by her fervid belief that “the basis for understanding the 
problems of political science is the same as the basis for understanding business 
administration—it is the understanding of the nature of integrative unities” (Follett 
1926e, 190). After her passing in 1933, little was made of her work, and despite the tacit 
influence her ideas has had on the fields of management and organizational 
development, and despite her being hailed as “the prophet of management” by no less a 
management luminary than Peter Drucker, Follett’s thinking and writing has not 
penetrated the general consciousness (Child 2013, 74-75; Graham 1995, 17-19). 
However, Follett’s theories and works were not completely forgotten. Follett’s 
pioneering thinking in the area of conflict resolution influenced what was to become the 
seminal work in the field of negotiation – Walton and McKersie’s A Behavioral Theory 
of Labor Negotiations – that went on to serve as the authoritative text in the field 
(Kochan 1991, ix-xiv; Kochan and Lipsky 2003, 15-19). Walton and McKersie’s work 
shifted thinking about labor negotiations from an institutional economics perspective to 
a social/behavioral paradigm that emphasized the sub-processes that must be addressed 
to make negotiation work for the parties so engaged. This new paradigm described four 
sub-processes: distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, intra-organizational 
bargaining, and attitudinal structuring. 
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Distributive bargaining is the sub-process by which parties approach a bargaining 
situation through the lens of a zero-sum game, as used by rational choice theorists. There 
is some set amount of a good to be distributed, and every unit the first party gets is a unit 
the second party does not get. When engaged in distributive bargaining, parties seek to 
maximize advantage through various tactics, and those vary dependent upon the degree 
of interdependence present in their relationship (e.g., workers and managers are in long-
term relationships and will use tactics that might not be effective when haggling at a flea 
market) (Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and McKersie 2000, 259-85). 
Integrative bargaining is the sub-process by which parties approach a bargaining 
situation as joint problem-solving so as to expand the amount of the good to be 
distributed and to make each party “a winner.” Integrative bargaining, analytically, relies 
upon something like integration as Follett conceptualizes it. Parties to an integrative 
bargain eschew compromise as unnecessary sacrifice and instead seek to satisfy the 
interests of all parties as it relates to the problem. Sometimes interests dovetail enough 
to allow integration within the narrow confines of the issue being addressed. At other 
times, integration can be elusive within that single issue and only by broadening the 
scope of the problem to include multiple issues and concomitantly more interests can an 
integrative solution be achieved.  
Intra-organizational bargaining is the sub-process that accounts for the dynamics 
present when parties to the bargain act as representatives of groups or organizations. 
Representatives very often must negotiate within their own group or organization to 
achieve approval regarding the bargained for agreement. Often the only ones within their 
group or organization privy to all the details of the bargain and the experiences and 
dynamics with the other bargainers, representatives must employ various tactics to 
convince their constituents that the deal negotiated should be accepted. Moreover, intra-
organizational bargaining happens throughout the bargaining process, not just at the 
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end with regard to the final agreement. In the case of distributive bargaining, target 
points (where the parties would like to end up), resistance points (where the parties will 
likely refuse the agreement), and other forms of rational choice analysis must be done 
with constituents prior to and throughout the bargaining process. In the case of 
integrative bargaining, constituents’ interests must be determined, and they must 
measure the acceptability of proposed solutions against the degree to which those 
interests are satisfied. 
The final sub-process, attitudinal structuring, acknowledges that the relationship 
between the bargaining parties matters to achieving the outcome most desired. Lack of 
trust, poor communication to constituents, and other factors contribute to failure to 
reach agreement, even when a deal is otherwise possible. This acknowledgement of the 
importance of managing relationships reflects Follett’s concept of circular response and 
her dictum that “I respond not only to you, but to the relation between you and me” 
(Follett 1926a, 42-45).  
Since A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, the use of IBN has greatly 
expanded. Also referred to as mutual gains, integrative, principled, or win-win 
negotiation, the interest-based approach to negotiation gained popularity in 1981 with 
the publication of Roger Fisher and William Ury’s Getting to Yes (Barrett 2004, 209-11; 
Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993). Defined as an “[a]ct of back-and-forth 
communication focused on reconciling interests with the goal of reaching an agreement,” 
IBN has spread beyond the realm of labor negotiations into the public and private sector 
and throughout various industries (Barrett 2004, 209-37; Yarn 1999, 228).  
The Process of Interest-Based Negotiation 
The General Model. The contemporary development of integrative bargaining 
based on the principles elucidated by Follett has resulted in various frameworks for 
discussing the process for using IBN. Major thought leaders in the field of negotiation 
			 63 
who offer hands-on negotiation training use different models – Harvard University’s 
Project on Negotiation teaches one proprietary process, Cornell University’s School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations teaches another. Both of these models, as well as various 
others, share common characteristics and a general understanding of the contours of a 
process based on the integrative process model developed in A Behavioral Theory of 
Labor Negotiations (Barrett and O’Dowd 2005, 65-89; Cutcher-Gershenfeld 2003, 141-
60; Fisher, Ury, and Patton 2011, 17-96; Walton and McKersie 1991, 126-43). Moreover, 
since the interest-based process is one where the participants are ultimately in control, it 
makes sense the process would vary from use to use, with, for example, tasks assigned to 
a certain step of the process getting addressed in a different step. Consider the instance 
of Kaiser, where the partnership continually broke new ground and processes were 
invented and modified as needed to approach problems using interest-based principles. 
In general, however, any instantiation of IBN will bear a family resemblance to 
the model discussed below. Here I provide a basic overview and understanding of this 
model to provide a general sense of its essential components and the steps in the process 
while overlooking some nuances and additional steps that might be appropriate for 
actual use in various situations. After explaining the model, I will conclude by clarifying 
how various aspects of the process thus described counter or otherwise address the 
concerns raised about the viability of deliberative democratic processes in terms of 
capacity, epistemology, power, and feasibility. 
Facilitation and Training. IBN commonly uses a facilitator trained both in neutral 
facilitation generally and in the specific features and techniques of interest-based 
processes. Facilitation, generally, can be defined as the process of helping groups to 
arrive at mutually acceptable outcomes. This understanding comes from the Latin facilis 
(“easy”) but also from facere (“do, make”). The aspiration, therefore, is for facilitators to 
make agreements easy. Various other definitions of facilitation capture these 
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fundamental features. Fisher, Ury, and Patton offer a process-oriented definition of 
facilitation: “Someone at the meeting needs to facilitate – to keep the meeting on track, 
to make sure everyone gets a chance to speak, to enforce any ground rules, and to 
stimulate discussion by asking questions” (63). However, others who view facilitation 
more in terms of its potential to transform people and relationships offer more expansive 
definitions. As the International Association of Facilitators (IAF) describes facilitators in 
its Statement of Values and Code of Ethics, 
Facilitators are called upon to fill an impartial role in 
helping groups become more effective. We act as process 
guides to create a balance between participation and 
results… 
 
As group facilitators, we believe in the inherent value of the 
individual and the collective wisdom of the group. We 
strive to help the group make the best use of the 
contributions of each of its members. We set aside our 
personal opinions and support the group’s right to make its 
own choices. We believe that collaborative and cooperative 
interaction builds consensus and produces meaningful 
outcomes (IAF 2004). 
 
 Sam Kaner, a prominent consultant and thinker in the field of facilitation, argues 
in his seminal work on the subject that the role of a facilitator “is to support everyone to 
do their best thinking” (Kaner 2014, 31). He believes this can only be achieved if the 
facilitator encourages full participation, promotes mutual understanding, fosters 
inclusive solutions, and cultivates shared responsibility (Kaner 2014, 23-40). 
Encouraging full participation attempts to overcome participant censorship self-imposed 
through risk-aversion and apprehension about potential negative reaction from other 
members of the group through helping to draw out reticent participants. In an 
environment that practices the value of full participation, participants become more 
assertive and are better able and more inclined to share their thinking or simply to think 
aloud, and participants actively encourage each other to behave in these ways. 
Correspondingly, such an environment actively discourages unconstructive behaviors 
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like private sidebars between participants, aggressive argumentation and posturing, and 
the deployment of sarcasm, as these behaviors tend to hinder full participation. 
Facilitators promote mutual understanding to help participants overcome their 
entrenched positions on issues so that they may better understand other participants’ 
interests and ultimately come to sustainable and mutually satisfactory agreements. One 
way facilitators achieve this end is to ensure they behave impartially, validate all 
perspectives (without agreeing with any), and show equal concern and respect to all 
participants – in this way, participants may grow less defensive because they will have 
“confidence that someone understands them,” and thus that others may understand 
them as well. Mutual understanding is the basis for the reciprocal acknowledgement that 
all of the participants have interests that matter and further serves as the basis for 
participants to reexamine and revise their own thinking (Kaner 2014, 23-40).  
Fostering inclusive solutions complements and reinforces mutual understanding, 
as it seeks to instill a sense that positive-sum outcomes are achievable by generating 
creative ideas to meet the needs of all participants. Inclusive solutions can only be 
achieved by travelling through what Kaner refers to, appropriately, as the “Groan Zone” 
(Kaner 2014, 3-22). In Kaner’s model of group dynamics, group discussion begins with 
the enunciation of commonly held opinions on the topic at hand and proceeds to the 
sharing of increasingly different perspectives – a phase of the group dynamics he refers 
to as divergent thinking. When the group passes from sharing opinions and perspectives 
to engaging with them through listening, questioning, and learning, they have arrived in 
the Groan Zone, and this period typically produces a great deal of consternation, 
defensiveness, emotional expression, and general discomfort as participants must 
“struggle in order to integrate new and different ways of thinking with their own” (Kaner 
2014, 18). A skilled facilitator can act to make sure that this period remains constructive 
by ensuring full participation and promoting mutual understanding, and in addition the 
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facilitator can help participants to appreciate the value of this stage in the process, that 
this period is normal, and is in fact desirable, as after the period ends participants will be 
prepared to engage in convergent thinking that will winnow down the discussion into an 
agreement. 
Finally, facilitators cultivate a sense of shared responsibility for the success of the 
process. Facilitators are not primarily enforcers of rules and norms, though that is part 
of their role. A truly effective process, one that leads to a truly satisfactory agreement, 
can only be created and sustained by the participants themselves. Among other things, 
cultivating a sense of shared responsibility means that the facilitator must act to 
neutralize the distorting effects of power or authority on the process. And this can only 
be done if the process itself expressly acknowledges this role of the facilitator and all 
participants in the process agree to be bound by those rules. So empowered, the 
facilitator can encourage those with a tendency to wield power (consciously or not) to 
recognize what they are doing and to provide alternative, constructive routes to getting 
their interests met. Similarly, the facilitator can encourage those who are disengaged to 
recognize that their deference to power (political or epistemic) may not result in the 
necessary inclusion of their voice and perspective, and so the creative, integrative 
solution that must emerge from the process may elude the group. Shared responsibility 
ultimately creates a sense of ownership for the process and its outcome, and that sense of 
ownership acts to neutralize the use of power by virtue of making its exercise 
counterproductive (Kaner 2014, 23-40). 
The process used to facilitate IBN encompasses the general facilitation functions 
endorsed by Kaner and the IAF for facilitation of other kinds of group planning and 
decision-making. However, IBN facilitation supplements these functions in several 
important ways. Extrapolating from Walton and McKersie’s prescription for successful 
integrative negotiations, Macneil and Bray contend that IBN facilitators must also 
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motivate the parties to participate in the process and must actively build trust (Macneil 
and Bray 2013, 704-06). Through deploying “attitudinal structuring tactics,” such as 
emphasizing common ground, enforcing standards of conduct, and reminding 
participants of their shared fate, participants can be motivated to overcome any initial 
reticence, which should be encouraged as lackluster participation will undermine the 
process. Trust is also an asset to negotiation, and a foundation of trust between the 
participants, between the facilitator and the participants, and between the participants 
and their respective constituents will support and sustain the process.  
Walton and McKersie themselves raised concerns about bringing about the right 
psychological states to induce trust, closely related to Follett’s notion that circular 
response requires us to prepare the other party to accept reconciliation. Walton and 
McKersie note psychological studies that the absence of trust in group dynamics leads to 
a litany of problematic behaviors including defensiveness, not sharing and/or distorting 
information and communication, unwillingness to experiment, and impaired cognitive 
functioning.  
The use of a neutral facilitator and joint training of the participants in the IBN 
process both serve to increase the level of trust. A neutral facilitator encourages the 
parties to respect the ground rules and the interest-based process itself. As guardian of 
the process, the facilitator gains the trust of the parties by even-handed facilitation and 
rule enforcement. Once even untrusting parties are comfortable that the process can be 
trusted, they may begin to take risks and exhibit behaviors to one another that 
demonstrate their trustworthiness, thus increasing trust in each other as well as the 
process.  
The IBN process strongly encourages (and most users, like the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service, require) that the parties to negotiation, and sometimes 
constituents, be trained together (Barrett and O’Dowd 2005, 113-14; Chaykowski et al. 
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2001, 20-22). This joint learning sets the stage for increased trust as during the training 
the parties ask questions, develop skills, and learn about each other both during the 
training proper and through informal interaction – all in a context outside the 
negotiating room. Inviting key constituents, such as influential thought leaders and 
skeptics, serves as a means of helping constituents to understand the process and to 
manage their expectations (Chaykowski et al. 2001, 18-22). Frequently the facilitator is 
also the trainer, but even if not, facilitators often provide on-the-spot training as 
participants may require refreshers at difficult moments or lack skill in how to 
implement a sub-process. This emphasis on training also aligns with Follett’s 
recommendation for overcoming obstacles to integration.  
Joint training creates the best likelihood of reaching valued agreements; it 
reduces distrust on the part of the parties with less power in the relationship (because 
they do not automatically assume the new process is a ploy by the party with greater 
power); and shared learning humanizes people and provides a common understanding 
to begin the working relationship. IBN shifts the emphasis from being adversaries to 
being advocates for interests. Joint training is also a critical process move that 
“familiarizes people with IBN principles, . . . builds cohesion and prepares negotiators” 
so that they “know what to expect” (Kolb 2004, 41). 
Joint training should include an explanation of the process, practice with 
understanding interests and the skills to uncover interests through active listening, and 
how to ask questions without invoking defensiveness and other competitive behaviors. 
Participants should be given an opportunity to then use the process on either a real 
problem with a sufficiently small scope appropriate to the length of the training or an 
appropriate scenario provided by the trainer / facilitator. Joint training also should allow 
an opportunity for the trainer / facilitator to meet with the parties separately, including 
key constituents and thought leaders from their constituency who are not designated 
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negotiators, so that all concerns can be aired and addressed that may not have been 
raised while the other party was present. 
While training and facilitation are often provided by the same person, the skill set 
of a trainer may not translate into the skill set of a facilitator. According to Hogan 
(2002), trainers often have a stronger sense of ego that can interfere with the role of 
facilitation, since trainers see their role as content experts delivering information and 
developing skills in alignment with that expertise (31-33). Facilitators often need to 
train, both through joint-training and on-the-spot training, and a low-ego approach to 
training is perfectly compatible with the roles and values of facilitation. 
Process. 
1. Pre-Negotiation Preparation 
Sometimes referred to as pre-bargaining, pre-negotiation, or merely preparation, 
this step ensures several ends are met. First, it explains the IBN process to the parties 
and discerns whether it is appropriate to meet their needs and expectations (and the 
needs and expectations of their constituents). If the goal is to make everyone best 
friends, or conversely if the goal is only to cut a deal in the next three hours, then IBN is 
likely not the best tool. Similarly, if power dynamics and disparities are too great and 
cannot be ameliorated by the urgency of the situation which caused the parties to seek a 
change in their process initially, this may not be the right time for an interest-based 
approach. Finally, if the constituents represented refuse to accept this approach to 
negotiation (after the process has been explained to them) that might be viewed as 
unacceptably “soft” or otherwise inapposite, then more pre-work might have to be done 
to educate their constituencies about the merits and workings of this approach, including 
the opportunity for full-fledged training. Spending time on developing a mandate from 
constituencies to support an interest-based approach will make the job of negotiators 
easier in the sense that they will be better able to focus on developing solutions that meet 
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all the interests rather than also needing to allocate disproportionate attention to 
addressing constituent behaviors designed to undermine their representatives who in 
their eyes are not driving hard enough bargains. 
Second, the parties must set the agenda and agree on what information may be 
needed to address those issues. Ideally, issue agendas are framed in a manner that allows 
for exploration of the issue and invites dialogue and creativity rather than disagreement. 
So, if the problem being addressed is whether to approve the use of medical marijuana 
on college campuses, for instance, the issue might be usefully framed as “What are the 
best ways to ensure that students with legally prescribed medical marijuana can use it 
when they most need it?” This framing would invite participants to learn about the legal 
uses of medical marijuana, when people with covered afflictions might need to use it, the 
impact of marijuana use on student learning, health, and safety, and the like. A less 
useful framing would be “Should medical marijuana be allowed on college campuses?” 
This framing invites a positional, yes-or-no mindset where people take a position and 
then defend it. This framing reduces the likelihood of finding a solution that works for 
everyone because the listening and learning required to do so is cut off by the need to 
make your position the winning one. 
Once the agenda is decided, the parties must decide whether any of the issues 
require additional data or information in order for the negotiation to proceed. If so, 
subcommittees are formed to gather the data consisting of members from different 
constituencies represented in the negotiation. This is done for two reasons – (1) to give 
the parties an opportunity to work together and build collegial relations and (2) to 
ensure that the information gathered is considered valid by the parties. This joint inquiry 
approach to information gathering helps reduce the likelihood that the parties will talk 
past each other because they do not share a mutual understanding of the relevant facts. 
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Third, the parties must establish ground rules. Ground rules are group norms 
related to behavior, process, and culture designed to keep the consensus-building 
environment in place, especially in the face of heightened stress and emotion (Maiese 
2004). Among various ground rules the parties might adopt include those addressing 
respectful communication, the frequency and length of the negotiating sessions, and 
whether food will be provided during the sessions. Ground rules in and of themselves 
provide an environment more likely to support integration for the negotiators because 
these norms can be used to curtail non-cooperative behavior in other participants, thus 
reducing the likelihood of defensiveness. 
The development of ground rules also provides the new group an opportunity to 
apply its newly learned interest-based skills to the problem of creating standards of 
conduct that the group wishes to take shared responsibility for enforcing. These 
standards are generated by the participants, and they are agreed upon by consensus 
using the process that will be described below. In a sense, the facilitator helps the group 
to form its own nomos (in both the formal and informal senses) because the ground rules 
are most often not articulated with great specificity (e.g., show respect), and so the 
facilitator helps to develop a cultural standard over many interactions about what the 
group considers to be unacceptable violations of any particular standard. There is 
another sense in which the establishment and observance of ground rules may be 
appropriately thought of as nomos, and that is in relation to physis. Absent nomos, 
negotiating parties are prone to behaviors that trigger natural, yet unhelpful, 
psychological responses (e.g., the fight, flight, or freeze response). This taming of the 
physis by the nomos is yet another way in which IBN takes seriously our natural 
emotional minds and seeks to harmonize it with our rational minds. 
Fourth, and finally, the parties prepare opening statements. These statements are 
meant to set the tone for the negotiation, and they should reflect the reasons each of the 
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parties represented chose the interest-based process to solve the problem(s) at hand. 
They should be honest statements, made constructively to help the parties better 
understand each other. For instance, an opening statement might go as follows,  
The Associated Students are glad to be here today. We 
believe the issue of medical marijuana on campus is too 
important to be left to the typical back-and-forth shouting 
that social issues often invoke. We are looking forward to 
working with you all to figure out a way forward on this 
issue. 
 
A different statement among the stakeholders might be, 
As a concerned parent and officer of the Parents’ 
Association, I must say frankly that I’m not thrilled about 
discussing this. I doubt it is a good idea to let medical 
marijuana onto campus, but I also know this issue 
continues to come up and the only way to address it 
completely is try to find a way to make it work for 
everyone. If that’s possible, then I’m willing to participate 
in figuring it out. 
 
A third statement might be, 
I represent the Campus Police. We have serious concerns 
about allowing gateway drugs on campus, and especially in 
the dorms. If those concerns can be met, then we don’t 
want to stand in the way of people using their prescription 
medicine. We hope there’s a way to do that, in fact, because 
we don’t want to be the bad guys here. 
 
All of these statements are useful to participants, as they help us to understand 
the motives and interests of the parties. They also give us a starting point for learning 
even more. The Associated Students appear eager to talk about the issue, while the 
Parents’ Association seems resigned to the fact that this needs to be addressed once and 
for all, and that means neutralizing the issue by making all the stakeholders happy. The 
Campus Police appear to have concerns about gateway drugs, dorms, and their image. 
All of these interests, and those yet to be discovered, will need to be considered as the 
process continues and potential solutions are crafted. 
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2. Negotiation Process 
The opening session handles some mundane organizational tasks, such as seating 
arrangements, location of restrooms, and the like, but every item addressed, whether 
substantive or mundane, is an opportunity for the facilitator to model values and 
behaviors that are likely to contribute to group cohesion and generally productive group 
dynamics. The IAF Statement of Values and Code of Ethics guides some of this, but so do 
group norms or ground rules, that , if not previously developed, are also developed in the 
opening session.  
The first step of the negotiation is to clarify the issue being addressed. (If there 
are multiple issues being addressed, then the sequence of steps in the negotiation 
process are repeated for each issue.) The purpose here is to fully explore the problem, 
share information, learn what needs to be known but currently is not, and to define the 
problem. Without a full sharing of information, the problem may not be defined 
appropriately to generate integrative solutions at the final step. This step will also 
inevitably be revisited as the process continues, since new ideas, dead ends, and 
unforeseen opportunities might present the need for additional information and/or 
redefinition of the problem. In any case, the problem should be framed as “a problem to 
be solved” and not simply a statement to focus the parties on their relationship as joint 
problem solvers.  
This first step of the process comports with Follett’s advice to present all the 
information, to recognize the relationship is part of the process, to recognize that careful 
use of language (what we might call framing) matters, and to approach the issue as a 
problem presented by the situation. This step of the process begins a recursive discussion 
attempting to define the problem the parties wish to solve. The discussion might begin 
with a sense of what brought the parties to the table, such as a “neighborhood noise” 
problem. The parties then share their experiences, histories, positions, and interests 
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related to the problem, and through engaged listening parties begin to learn and 
understand more about the nature of the problem and about each other. Ultimately, the 
parties agree to a working definition of the problem, framed as an open-ended problem-
solving question, so as to focus the parties on trying to answer the question and to keep 
them in a problem-solving mindset.  
The second step is to identify the parties’ interests. Often parties quite naturally 
come to a negotiation with one or more preconceived notions about how to address the 
problem being discussed. These notions are called positions, and though positional 
thinking leads to a host of anti-collaborative behaviors, positions are also useful to the 
extent that they can be unpacked to learn about the underlying interests that the position 
ostensibly serves. Parties may ask questions to learn about the interests of others and are 
encouraged to do so to increase mutual understanding and to focus the parties on the 
subjective parameters of a potential solution. This focus on interests rather than 
positions is a multi-step process that keeps participants from latching onto a single, 
desired “solution” too early. Recognizing that interests are inherently subjective, they are 
not subject to critique, even if another participant believes they are based on errors of 
fact. As the process continues, the participants will have opportunities to learn about the 
interests of others in relation to the concrete problem being addressed and all 
participants will work together to weigh and balance the sometimes competing interests 
and to determine whether any may be adapted or eliminated as their shared 
understanding of the problem develops. 
The third step is to search for alternate solutions and their consequences. This 
step emphasizes creativity, or Follett’s “invention,” as it assumes that if obvious solutions 
existed then the need to negotiate would be obviated. Activities such as brainstorming 
are typically employed in this stage to generate alternatives. Then, only after the 
brainstorming period has ended, the alternatives are examined thoroughly for their 
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anticipated consequences. They are not yet evaluated as desirable or otherwise; the 
anticipated outcomes are merely projected. This step requires parties to evaluate the 
alternatives presented against their interests to determine if any of the solutions – 
individually or in some combination – satisfy their interests. Each party may not arrive 
at their interest maximizing solution, and instead only reach their interest satisficing 
solution. If there is room to improve one party’s outcomes by modifying the possible 
solution being considered without hurting the other parties’ outcomes (i.e., if the 
possible solution being considered is not Pareto-optimal), such changes may be made. If 
parties do not agree upon an acceptable solution, return to steps one and/or two may be 
necessary to find the integrative solution.  
This step also encompasses evaluating the alternatives against agreed upon 
objective standards to determine the appropriateness of the alternative. An objective 
standard is a standard that exists outside the control of the participants, applies to all of 
the participants, and is practical. One example of an objective standard might be an 
appraisal when trying to make a real estate deal. Another might be reference to free 
speech jurisprudence when trying to design a civility policy for citizen speech at city 
council meetings. 
The fourth and final step is to reach consensus on a decision, solution, or course 
of action. For some negotiations, no agreement will result, or agreement will be reached 
on only a limited basis. Another feature implied in the original model is that agreement 
must be reached or no agreement can be made. One modern enhancement to the process 
requires consensus decision-making, which can be defined as a process seeking the lack 
of major objections to an agreement (Yarn 1999, 122). Major objections provide parties 
to the potential agreement with a veto over its final adoption. Entering into an interest-
based negotiation with the understanding that it is a consensus-based decision-making 
process also reduces risk and increases trust by lowering the stakes of sharing 
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information and of communicating. Voting, an expression of power by more numerous 
factions, is eschewed. 
3.  Productive Circularity 
Although the process outlined above appears to proceed in a set of tidy steps, 
from pre-negotiation through four stages of negotiation itself, as implemented it 
proceeds through a more complicated and discursive dance among the parties. It is not 
at all uncommon, in latter stages of the decisional process, for the group to realize that it 
must return to and repeat an earlier step. As discussion continues the parties may realize 
that they now see facts as relevant they did not gather in their pre-negotiation process 
and that they should charge a subgroup of participants to investigate the newly 
important information and report back or jointly engage an outside expert to attend and 
answer questions. As participants begin to discuss potential solutions, they may react in 
ways that suggest the presence of an interest that did not arise in the prior inventory, and 
the conversation may turn away from the solutions to a deeper exploration of the interest 
that is being discovered, so that it may be considered once the group returns to 
examining options to address all relevant interests. The need to return to a prior step 
may be noted by a facilitator, but is just as often identified by one of the participants, 
drawing on the joint training regarding IBN process and terminology. Participants may 
need time to “loop out” or engage in intra-organizational bargaining, speaking with 
others who share their interests, including any formal constituency that they may have 
(if they are the selected representatives of a group such as a union), and then to bring 
information gleaned from those communications back to the table. Even once a decision 
has been reached, it may be adopted provisionally and subjected to a continuous 
improvement process, sometimes captured by the mantra Plan-Do-Act-Check, under 
which a change is planned, tested, implemented, and then revisited in case it is not 
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working as planned or can be improved, so that further cycles of decision-making can be 
had (American Society for Quality 2004). 
This practice of working the process in a manner that is more circular than linear 
calls back to Follett’s concept of circular response, the sense in which our interactions 
with each other lead to influencing both each other’s actions and our relationship to each 
other (Follett 1926d, 104-07). As we work through the process in a series of spirals, 
returning to the applicable step in an ever tightening circle leading toward a point of 
consensus, our actions are shaped by the recognition that as we work on the issue, we are 
developing our understanding of the issue, our own interests regarding that issue, and 
how our interests relate to those of other participants, in ways that transform our 
understanding of the conflict, our relationship to it, and the possible solutions that 
would address it.  
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SECTION THREE 
Integrative Politics 
In the preceding section, I examined IBN in the labor-management context as a 
specific implementation of the integrative model of problem-solving developed by Mary 
Parker Follett and honed by subsequent negotiation practitioners. As the examples of 
Madison College, the Maricopa Community College District, and the Kaiser-Permanente 
health care system demonstrated, IBN in practice is capable of bringing large and 
disparate groups of stakeholders together to reach mutually acceptable solutions to 
shared policy problems. It does so by deploying a systematic, discursive approach to the 
problem at hand, beginning with a thorough exploration of the parties’ interests and 
building toward solutions that address all interests, seizing on opportunities to 
transform both the dispute and the parties’ relationship through that process of joint 
exploration. 
Returning to the political sphere, in this final section I consider the implications 
of IBN’s success for the challenges of democracy and democratic deliberation. 
Comparing IBN’s integrative methodology with that posited by the deliberativists in the 
abstract, I explain how integrative methods grapple with the problems of capacity, 
epistemology, power, and feasibility arising from deliberation in practice. Drawing on 
those insights, I articulate several potential lessons for the implementation and theory of 
deliberative and participatory models of democratic decision-making. Finally, I touch on 
areas of potential future exploration, beyond the scope of this work, that are suggested 
by my analysis.   
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Chapter Seven 
Avoiding the Pitfalls of a Transactional Model 
As the foregoing summary reflects, the discursive model of integrative problem-
solving is very different than the ideal discourse described by many theorists of 
deliberative democracy. This is particularly true of deliberativists coming from the 
Rawlsian tradition, where the emphasis on the giving of public reasons generates a 
process in which participants exchange justifications, grounded in generalizable 
principles, to support their preferred policy positions (Thompson 2008, 513-14). Even 
deliberativists grounded in Habermasian discourse theory, who acknowledge and 
welcome the transformative power of talk, often do not specify exactly how talk can be 
productively deployed to transformative effect.  
Contemporary IBN methods based on Follett’s theories, in contrast, prescribe a 
methodology by which participants from a broad variety of backgrounds and 
perspectives can come together in a dialogue that transforms both the disputants and the 
dispute. These specific strategies, I contend, meaningfully address many of the critiques 
and concerns that plague the more transactional or less specified discursive methods 
propounded by deliberativists. Returning to the taxonomy of those critiques laid out in 
my introductory chapters – capacity, epistemology, power, and feasibility – I will 
examine how integrative models address these challenges to deliberative success. 
Capacity 
In one sense, integrative problem-solving provides no comfort to those who are 
concerned about the capacity of the general public to engage in deliberative discourse. 
That is the sense in which capacity concerns are based on the time and resources that 
deliberation consumes and the practical ability of average persons to expend their 
limited resources on that participation. Integrative problem-solving is time consuming, 
so much so that a repeated motto is “we need to go slow to go fast” (Sibbet 2008, 37). 
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The emphasis on taking the necessary time to prepare and then to work the problem is 
essential to the functioning of the integrative method, because the time-consuming steps 
of training, preparing, and working through interests and possibilities, often in a series 
of meetings over a period of weeks or months, are necessary to identify the prospect of 
integrative solutions. But in this regard, interest-based methods are not materially worse 
than other deliberative methods of democratic decision-making. Moreover, to the extent 
that integrative decision-making can deliver both high levels of participant satisfaction 
and substantively useful outcomes, it may be more likely to garner resource support than 
deliberative models that cannot show such results. Finally, when compared to non-
deliberative methods of decision-making, it is not clear that the costs imposed by an 
interest-based approach are excessive. Non-deliberative approaches may be quick 
(although they often are not), but they will rarely succeed in meeting all or most relevant 
interests, and their unsatisfactory solutions will be revisited repeatedly as power 
dynamics shift. Moreover, to the extent that interest-based models provide beneficial 
secondary effects as discussed below, those effects may justify the commitment of 
additional time and resources. 
In a deeper sense, integrative problem-solving’s emphasis on interests rather 
than positions upends traditional concerns about the comparative capacity of 
participants to engage effectively in democratic discourse, particularly concerns about 
inequality of capacity. In a more transactional model of discourse, the capacity to 
deliberate requires substantive knowledge of the intricacies of policy positions, coupled 
with the ability to assess, articulate, and defend those positions. In an integrative model, 
the capacity that participants bring to the table is their innate understanding of their 
own interests in the problem under discussion. Knowing one’s own interests does not 
require any special educational background, and the group (with the guidance of the 
facilitator) will work together to examine and explore all participants’ interests before 
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proceeding to develop solutions (and again if needed as the discussion proceeds). 
Because the process focuses on interests and options, rather than positions, people with 
relevant experience who will be personally affected by the decision become key sources 
of information and insight. In a way, this is similar to the testimony approach that 
Sanders posits as an alternative that addresses concerns regarding power, although, 
unlike Sanders, it uses this more testimonial approach in the pursuit of potential 
consensus and not just improved participation for its own sake (Sanders 1997, 370-73). 
IBN also incorporates joint training, from the outset, to ensure that all 
participants have the necessary understanding of the process, increasing the likelihood 
that all participants will share a common, adequate level of training that builds capacity 
in the relevant sense. The IBN methodology proceeds by a series of relatively 
straightforward steps that can be clearly explained to persons from a broad range of 
backgrounds, and shared training empowers all participants to call the group’s attention 
back to the agreed-upon process and any ground rules, providing a mechanism for even 
less-experienced participants to keep the process in check and open to all. IBN’s 
thorough attendance to issues of group dynamics (Sanders 1997, 367) reflects a concern 
that process must be managed in order to be inclusive. 
Integrative methods rely more heavily on inter-subjective validity – whether the 
potential solutions will meet the interests of the participants as the participants 
understand them – thereby emphasizing the relevance of the experiences and knowledge 
of participants and deemphasizing the need for outside experts. As the process proceeds, 
if knowledge of extrinsic facts is needed, IBN methodology counsels that the parties work 
together to identify the information that is needed and then to seek that information, or 
to agree upon an expert, and to bring the information or expertise back to be considered 
and incorporated. This joint inquiry process reduces the neutrality concerns that plague 
			 82 
models where “experts” are brought in to provide background information, identify 
issues, or even prescribe policy options that are used to shape the discussion.  
Epistemology 
With regard to the ability of even well-trained participants to develop deliberative 
capacity, IBN’s insistence that the parties build up from an understanding of underlying 
interests to possible solutions, rather than beginning by arguing competing positions, 
again does significant and important work. For the apathetic hobbits (to use Brennan’s 
terminology), framing the discussion in terms of their personal interests may do more to 
inspire direct involvement than discussions over abstractions that may seem irrelevant 
to their lives. A focus on how those interests could actually be met also serves as a 
pleasant contrast to the apparently ceaseless and unproductive combat that seems to 
characterize so much of our current political discourse and may be one of the factors 
discouraging more active participation in political life.  
For the hooligans, swept up in waves of team spirit and the undertow of cognitive 
biases, the shift from positions to interests moves the conversation into new territory in 
which their views may be less congealed, such that new information may be considered 
and the conflict transformed. Politically active partisans likely know the slogans of the 
team with which they identify, generally in abstract forms (in Follett’s terms, “symbols”) 
such as “the right to bear arms is fundamental,” “we must take action to protect the 
planet,” or “repeal Obamacare now.” By asking participants to identify their interests in 
the issue under consideration, the conversation turns to more concrete and personal 
matters on which there are fewer political slogans in play, leading to better prospects for 
independent thought.  
Delving below the level of positions to explore interests also offers the prospect of 
discovering a greater variety of perspectives among members of the same team. Among 
those who subscribe to the abstract view that the right to bear arms is fundamental, we 
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may find lifelong hunters and hobbyists, persons anxious to protect their personal safety, 
and others concerned with resisting government oppression. The planet protectors may 
express preferences regarding spending time in nature, concerns about health issues 
associated with air or water quality, or economic concerns about how changes in climate 
will affect farming or tourism. The Obamacare foes may be concerned that they cannot 
afford mandatory insurance, believe that their personal circumstances do not require 
health insurance, worry that increased government regulation will reduce their health 
care choices, or think that a governmental single-payer system would be more effective 
in ensuring access to care. The variety of underlying interests in play offers opportunities 
for members of the same “team” to begin to understand that they are not necessarily 
always aligned, while also providing potential areas where participants may discover that 
there are interests that are either shared or not inconsistent between those who came to 
the process prepared to disagree.  
I have watched these discoveries take place in real time, and they are remarkable 
to witness. Once the participants start to see past the positional mode of thinking with 
which they usually enter, it is as though they cannot speak quickly enough to express all 
the new ideas and possibilities that are unlocked in their minds. Their behavior towards 
each other changes also. Not only do they start to communicate in language that 
emphasizes areas of commonality, but their body language begins to reflect increasing 
feelings of connection. Like the group tasked by Kaiser with examining possible options 
for the optical lab (Kochan et al. 2009, 59), they go from sitting in segregated groups to 
mixed seating, without any intervention on my part as facilitator. It is as though the shift 
from the old language of positions on which they hold views they find hard to consider or 
change to the new language of interest frees them from the cognitive biases and blocks 
associated with their well-established patterns of thinking. 
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Power 
The primacy of interest in an integrative problem-solving model levels the 
playing field among participants in a way that also ameliorates the concern that 
deliberative democracy is likely to exclude participation by individuals with less formal 
education, less language facility, or less comfort speaking in a public setting. Because the 
model requires respectful consideration, without passing judgment, of all interests put 
forth by participants, it is a much easier model to accommodate participation by a broad 
range of individuals than the more rigidly stylized, academic debate to which some other 
deliberative methods aspire. Emotional considerations and narrative contributions are 
expected, as these are natural modes in which to communicate about one’s own personal 
interests in an issue. IBN anticipates that emotions will play a key role in negotiations 
(Fisher and Shapiro 2005; Fisher, Ury, and Patton 2011). Rather than trying to make the 
process as emotionless as possible, IBN attempts to manage emotions so that they can be 
harnessed to do good where possible and released with minimal harm to the process 
where they cannot. 
This tendency to embrace all aspects of the human experience as relevant and 
acceptable in conflict resolution is reflected in the examples of which Follett was fond, 
many of which were recounted in the preceding description of her views. Follett saw 
conflict as an essential feature of collective life, no less important to resolve in the 
intimacy of the home or the familiarity of the office than in the grandest edifices of 
government. She was prone to explaining her views in terms accessible to broad 
audiences, not shying away from an example because it seemed too mundane or 
domestic. Simply put, integrative models are much more accommodating of humanness, 
both providing opportunities for the expression of participants’ interests in all of their 
messy and emotional reality and drawing on their lived experiences and intrinsic 
capabilities to empower their participation. 
			 85 
Facilitation and training also play key roles in managing power dynamics in an 
integrative model. The pre-negotiation steps of joint training and creation and 
agreement to ground rules provide opportunities to obtain participants’ commitments to 
norms that include supporting participation by all members. Both the facilitator and the 
participants can then call back as needed to those initial commitments to keep the 
process on track, including to manage assertions of power that could derail the 
collaborative nature of the process. Capable facilitators can intervene to draw out voices 
that are being unheard or to investigate and surface conflicts and discomforts that may 
be visible through non-verbal cues. When a participant struggles to make a point 
understood, facilitators can use active listening techniques to help the participants 
express themselves. Probing, supportive questions can clarify without overriding the 
participant’s own meaning. 
Integrative problem-solving can also serve to lessen the impact of extrinsic power 
dynamics on the substantive outcomes of the decision-making process. All negotiated 
decisions take place “in the shadow” of the alternatives to a negotiated agreement, in the 
sense that parties necessarily evaluate the possible negotiated outcome in comparison to 
what they might be able to obtain through another mode such as government action 
(through the legislative, executive, or judicial branch), exertion of economic power, or 
even the use of physical force (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979). In negotiation theory, we 
talk about BATNA (the best alternative to a negotiated agreement) or WATNA (the 
worst) as a means of helping participants to frame and evaluate the options presented to 
them (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 2011).  
Integrative problem-solving does not ignore the reality that the stakeholders with 
interests in the problem may have unequal power and options outside of the negotiation, 
but nonetheless seeks to help the parties realize that even those with greater power may 
benefit from adopting the “power-with” approach advocated by Follett. Even a party who 
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has significant ability to exercise “power-over” outside of the negotiated context may 
have reasons to refrain from doing so. Exercising power is costly. Power can be spent in 
the sense that it is effectively used up and not available for future needs, and expending 
power often requires the expenditure of material resources, as in the case of paying 
lawyers, lobbyists, or campaigners to influence government action or hiring security to 
lock out striking workers. It is also possible that power balances will shift in the future, 
meaning that the now-powerful group has an incentive to conserve relationships and 
support principles of fair treatment that it might need if its fortunes are later reversed. 
“Power-with” preserves and deepens relationships, generates more stable solutions 
(because they serve more interests), and opens up creative possibilities that can lead to 
the creation of options that do more to meet the powerful parties’ interests than the 
position they had thought to force outside of negotiations. IBN also avoids some of the 
power-related concerns articulated by Sanders because, unlike the deliberative models to 
which she was reacting, it does not treat certain perspectives or issues as off-limits or 
outside acceptable norms (Sanders 1997, 352-53). And by focusing on consensus 
regarding solutions that meet all articulated interests, it seeks to avoid the potential of 
oppressive compromise that replicates or magnifies structural inequalities (Follett 
1926a, 31-36; Sanders 1997, 362). 
In the integrative model, training expressly addresses and educates participants 
on this view of power, to help them begin understanding the potential downsides of 
choosing force over consensus and to open their minds to the possibility of other modes 
of interacting. As the negotiation begins in earnest, the facilitator works with the parties 
to tease out interests and begin to brainstorm possibilities, helping the parties to jointly 
investigate whether an integrative solution is available. And even when a perfectly 
integrative solution is not available, the parties are often able to craft an agreement that 
meets many of their interests – which is often a better solution for both the powerful and 
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the comparatively powerless than they would have realized through a more combative, 
win-lose (or lose-lose) process such as an election, lawsuit, or strike. They are also likely 
to leave the process with a strengthened working relationship that will serve them well in 
the future as new issues arise and power dynamics shift. 
Last, proponents of integrative models, because they seek to transform the 
participants’ understanding of themselves and their conflict, must be attentive to the 
issues of representativeness that have been raised as a concern regarding deliberative 
democracy. This concern is addressed in two ways. First, participants in the process are 
selected with the goal of ensuring representation of the various stakeholders who are 
likely to have an interest in the issue under study, and those participants are asked to 
think broadly and deeply about the interests at stake in an effort to avoid omissions 
(Susskind and Ozawa 2012). Second, the process is staged such that there are 
opportunities for the participants in the room to gather information from absent 
individuals to inform the process, whether in the form of inquiring about interests or 
looping out to provide updates and discuss potential agreements. Other members of the 
relevant community may be invited to participate as observers, from which they may 
develop a greater understanding of both the process and the solutions it has developed, a 
strategy used by Kaiser in its most recent rounds of contract negotiations to counter 
concerns about representation of rank-and-file members (Eaton and Kochan 2014, 305-
06). Continuous improvement processes can be built into agreements to provide a 
mechanism to check that the agreement reached in the room will be workable in the 
larger community, another mechanism to ensure that the deliberative process does not 
stray too far from representing the needs of the community for which it was developed 
and to encourage adoption of the experimental mindset Follett prescribes.  
			 88 
Feasibility 
With regard to the concern that deliberative democracy cannot solve certain 
problems, because the divisions among disputants are too deep and some of their views 
are deemed unacceptable by the model itself, integrative decision-making again 
approaches the challenge by redefining the relevant field of conflict management. Rather 
than beginning by fighting out who has the better reasons to support their positions, the 
process begins by compiling a comprehensive inventory of all interests at stake, without 
disqualifying any interest on the grounds that it is insufficiently rational or because it is 
based in either a doctrinal or factual view that not all participants could share. Interests 
are then examined and unpacked, looking beyond the initial framing of the interest to 
the underlying “why” – an exercise that often finds straightforward, generally relatable 
interests lurking underneath broader statements that might have appeared idiosyncratic 
or doctrinal.  
Even when the underlying interest truly is a unique one that not all participants 
could accept, the process of generating options nonetheless can often find a way to 
accommodate that interest without doing any harm to the more generally understood 
and common interests. An example I regularly use in training to illustrate how this works 
begins in an office, where there is a conflict regarding the kinds of lights to be used. One 
participant complains that they do not like the lights being used because those lights give 
that person migraines. That person’s interest, they disclose, is to avoid migraines. 
Another participant says that their interest is to keep the monsters away. Why is that an 
interest related to the lights? There are monsters in the desk drawers, the participant 
replies, and these particular lights keep the monsters in the drawers. Finding a 
resolution to this conflict does not require us to investigate whether monsters exist, or 
live in the drawers, or would do harm if they escaped. Instead, we might simply agree to 
lock the drawers and change the lightbulbs, or any one of a variety of solutions that 
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assuage the monster-fearing participant while alleviating the migraines. Because we are 
searching creatively for solutions that meet interests, we do not need to criticize or 
challenge the interests of others – we can simply try to work with them. Moreover, we 
will spend enough time examining interests and considering possible solutions that the 
parties often develop a new or different understanding of their own interests, such that 
an interest that seemed like an obstacle when first raised will have become more 
understandable or understood differently, such that it can be more easily reconciled with 
the other interests in play (Bazerman and Hoffman 2003, 267-68). Even if only a partial 
solution can be reached, improved relationships among the parties may render them 
better able to resolve the remaining issues in other ways (such as through the assertion 
of power or rights) without destroying their ability to live collectively. 
As to the other aspect of feasibility, the lack of political will to change existing 
political structures that benefit incumbents, the integrative model’s secret weapon is its 
track record of success. Particularly in a time of conflict and impasse, success is valuable 
and addictive. Kaiser’s early implementation of IBN provides a good example – while the 
agreement to try this new method was tentatively reached, it only truly began to take 
hold when it had such shockingly good results: in saving an optical lab destined for 
closure and opening a new hospital in a fraction of the expected time (Kochan et al. 
2009, 59). Similarly successful experiments in integrative politics could have a similar 
trickle-up effect, building a network of support for deliberative approaches to problems 
that appear otherwise intractable.  
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Chapter Eight 
Lessons of Integration for Political Decision-Making  
Beyond the ways in which integrative models address the critiques levied against 
traditional models of deliberative democracy, integration theory and practice have other 
implications for the problem of increasing productive deliberation in democracy. 
Deliberative Democracy Should Aim Higher 
Some deliberative democratic theorists have oddly low expectations. Thompson, 
for example, devotes a significant portion of his work to describing the intrinsic value of 
deliberation as a mutually respectful mode of making decisions, which he believes should 
reassure those who disagree with the outcome that at least the disadvantageous decision 
was adopted by a legitimate means (Thompson 2008, 502). Gutmann and Thompson 
devote an entire volume to the value of seeking compromise, rejecting at the outset the 
prospect that difficult collective problems can be solved without everyone giving up 
something important (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 16). Sanders, based on her 
concerns that compromises will be oppressive in ways that reinforce existing structural 
inequalities, advocates improving democratic participation through testimony for its 
own sake, without attempting a collective resolution of the problems raised by that 
testimony (Sanders 1997, 370-73). 
With that sales pitch, why would anyone want to participate in a deliberative 
process? If you are going to lose anyway, why not lose quickly at the ballot box or not 
bother to vote at all? Why give up your evenings and weekends to have people explain to 
you, ever so respectfully, why they do not and will never agree with you? What comfort is 
it that you lost your home or job or medical care through a theoretically legitimate 
process? While testimony can be informative and cathartic, would someone giving 
testimony perhaps also want some effort to be made to address the problems explored in 
that testimony? And if you believe you have power, why would you bother to 
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compromise and get less than you could demand through a method of decision-making 
in which you can control the outcome? 
Integration offers the prospect of more. Focusing on the panoply of interests at 
stake in a problem unlocks artificially binary positions and reveals an array of options 
available to meet the relevant interests. When we push past positional thinking and its 
rigidity to explore the interests underlying those positions, we can engage with what is 
really at stake, opening the dialogue to testimony in all its forms and permitting 
participants to be transformed sufficiently to be open to new solutions. Pushing past 
positions also enables participants to engage in mutual exploration of options, without 
prejudgment of what is “right,” “wrong,” or even “possible/impossible,” thereby opening 
up the possibilities of true consensus, as opposed to compromise. Sometimes that 
exploration will result in a truly integrative solution in which all interests can be met 
without material sacrifice. When that happens, it is generally because interests have been 
unpacked to their most fundamental level, where they can be recombined to include both 
areas in which interests align (we both want to work in the library) and areas in which 
interests differ and can both be accommodated (we want fresh air and no breezes). When 
it does not, knowing what interests are at stake still permits the parties to craft a solution 
that at least meets as many of the interests as can be accommodated simultaneously. 
Given that we know these outcomes are possible, we should strive to achieve them and 
hold out these possibilities as motivation to encourage involvement and experimentation 
with deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative Democracy Should Also Aim Lower 
Conversely, the track record of integrative problem-solving counsels that, in 
advocating deliberative democracy, we need not overreach in order to contribute. 
Integrative methods are more successful in certain settings. Concrete problems are well-
suited to integration, because the stakeholders can be identified and assembled, the 
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interests inventoried with reasonable accuracy, and potential solutions can be judged 
against the nature of the problem and the interests to be met. To the extent our collective 
life requires the resolution of more abstract principles or up or down votes on choices 
that are truly binary, integrative models would not be as helpful. However, as described 
in the following example, even an integrative approach that fails (in the sense of not 
resulting in conclusive legislation resolving all open policy issues) may nonetheless 
succeed by providing concrete and meaningful results. 
Integration encourages us to consider how much our collective life truly requires 
the conclusive resolution of these types of questions. Are we better served as a polity by 
reaching a final agreement on moral abstractions or by finding ways to live together in 
mutual respect and harmony despite our lack of agreement? In her study Civic Fusion, 
experienced public policy mediator Susan Podziba provides a compelling example of how 
facilitated discussion can be used by adherents of fundamentally opposing and fixed 
views to find a way to live together and deescalate violence, even on an issue as 
contentious as abortion (Podziba 2012, 75-96). Podziba was one of a team of two 
mediators who worked with a group of pro-life and pro-choice activists for a period of 
over six years in the wake of the Brookline, Massachusetts clinic shootings. These talks 
began in secret and under threat, with participants recounting death threats made 
against anyone who would dare “meet with the devil.”  
The talks themselves were intense. Unsurprisingly, they did not lead to either 
side changing its views on the issue of abortion itself or agreeing to policies regarding 
whether and when it should be permitted. But the shared experience of exploring their 
disagreement in depth built relationships of mutual respect and care that enabled the 
participants to take concrete steps to achieve peaceful coexistence without sacrificing 
their principles: 
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The talks among the leaders of the pro-life and pro-choice 
movements in Massachusetts contributed to a shift in the 
public rhetoric and increased security. . . . As a result of 
their talks, each leader took actions that contributed to that 
shift. [A pro-life leader] dissuaded a supporter of justifiable 
homicide from coming to Massachusetts to attend the 
[Brookline clinic shooter’s] trial. [A pro-choice leader] 
alluded to support and concern on the pro-life side at the 
first memorial of the shootings. The leaders toned down 
letters and op-eds submitted by their movements. The pro-
life participants warned [one of the pro-choice leaders] and 
contacted the FBI about a credible physical threat to her. 
The talks were a life-changing experience for each of these 
six women, who, over time, came to love and care for each 
other. They used to joke about how in another world they 
would be friends. They discovered many unique 
similarities. They were passionate activists, they were 
public leaders who managed organizations of passionate 
activists, they cared a great deal about women and 
women’s health, and they agreed that fewer unwanted 
pregnancies were better for society. 
. . . . 
There was a painful recognition of the great gap between 
the pro-life and pro-choice participants. Yet, it was this 
gap, the pain it caused, and a shared struggle to 
understand that energized their bonds of civic fusion. 
Ultimately, the mutual affection that grew among the pro-
life and pro-choice leaders enabled them to transcend their 
differences to connect across their common humanity. 
These bonds moved them to take actions that reduced the 
violent rhetoric of the abortion debate in Massachusetts. 
Among the actions the group elected to take was a lengthy joint statement setting out 
each side’s worldview, describing the talks, and communicating the lessons they learned. 
Although the talks had initially been conducted in secrecy, the participants came to 
believe that communicating about what they had done and what they had learned would 
help the community to move forward and heal from the past violence, laying a 
groundwork for both coexistence and the potential for resolution of policy questions in 
the future. In their own words, from that article as published, the experience was both 
personally and relationally transformative: 
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These conversations revealed a deep divide. We saw that 
our differences on abortion reflect two worldviews that are 
irreconcilable. If this is true, then why do we continue to 
meet? First, because when we face our opponent, we see 
her dignity and goodness. Embracing this apparent 
contradiction stretches us spiritually. We’ve experienced 
something radical and life-altering that we describe in 
nonpolitical terms: “the mystery of love,” “holy ground,” or 
simply “mysterious.” We continue because we are stretched 
intellectually, as well. This has been a rare opportunity to 
engage in sustained, candid conversations about serious 
moral disagreements. It has made our thinking sharper 
and our language more precise.  
. . . . 
We hope this account of our experience will encourage 
people everywhere to consider engaging in dialogues about 
abortion and other protracted disputes. In this world of 
polarizing conflicts, we have glimpsed a new possibility: a 
way in which people can disagree frankly and passionately, 
become clearer in heart and mind about their activism, 
and, at the same time, contribute to a more civil and 
compassionate society. 
Deliberative democrats would do well to remember that, just because deliberation 
cannot “solve” every issue, does not mean that it lacks value. Overcoming bias and 
distrust, in and of itself, can have positive effects on our ability to interact in more 
traditional political forums like legislatures (Foster, Mansbridge, and Martin 2013; 
Warren and Mansbridge 2013).  
Moreover, to the extent that some issues remain for resolution in other forums, 
the integrative process can better situate the parties to seek resolution in those forums. 
Using the abortion talks as an example, participants reported having engaged directly on 
policy issues and identifying areas of agreement around policies concerning adoption, 
teen pregnancy, sex education, and welfare benefits for single mothers (Podziba 2012, 
86-87). Given that their priority was to calm the violence and rhetoric endangering their 
community, they decided not to focus on these policy issues during their talks, but their 
exploration of the issues identified potential areas for legislative agreements in the 
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future. They also spent time discussing substantive policies on which they did not agree 
to increase their understanding of the ways in which their positions differed. To the 
extent integrative models provide this kind of increased understanding of interests in 
play (both our own and others’), they likely increase the ability of participants to reach 
the types of compromises or bargained agreements that may be the best solutions 
available, even if they must do so through a subsequent, non-integrative process. Where 
integration can help us to do so, it is worth the effort. 
We Need Not and Cannot Avoid Difficult Conversations 
As reflected in the description of the multi-year abortion talks, participants in the 
integrative model can engage in a direct and sustained matter with deep-seated beliefs 
and difficult emotions, standing in marked contrast to deliberative models that equate 
the giving of mutually acceptable reasons with respectful dialogue. The overlapping 
consensus model, in particular, seeks stability by asking participants to avoid talking 
about the parts of their views that they know others do not share, and focusing instead 
on offering reasons that might be more mutually agreeable (even if insincere) (Rawls 
1997, 116). A similar theme runs through Madison’s discussion of diminishing the effect 
of factions in Federalist 10: the more violent passions of each faction are to be calmed by 
hiding them from the decisional process, first by dissolving their influence in larger 
republics and then by filtering them through chosen representatives who whose higher 
wisdom and patriotism will override more partisan impulses (Madison, Hamilton, and 
Jay 1788, 40-46). It is as though this approach fears that, if we do not repress our 
differences, they will overwhelm and destabilize us. Based on current events, there is real 
reason to fear this prospect, as conflict escalates and we appear intent on ripping 
ourselves apart. As is true in so many other areas of life, repression does not appear to be 
working very well. 
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Follett encourages us to set aside our fear and welcome conflict instead. Since 
conflict is an inevitable manifestation of the differences between people that will be with 
us always, we should consider whether it can be brought to bear for our collective good, 
much as friction can be used as a form of productive physical energy (Follett 1926a, 30-
31). Young makes a similar point, encouraging deliberative models that emphasize the 
understanding of difference, which in turn permits us to assess the resources available to 
us collectively (Young 1996, 126). 
Only once we truly understand the conflict we face (by understanding the 
different interests that underlie it) can we begin doing the hard work of investigating 
whether and how those interests can be mutually addressed. And given that Follett was 
engaged in this analysis in the wake of the Great War’s shocking devastation, she 
understood that the stakes of failing to resolve our differences were very high. A 
particularly chilling passage makes her thinking in that regard clear: 
We have thought of peace as passive and war as the active 
way of living. The opposite is true. War is not the most 
strenuous life. It is a kind of rest cure compared to the task 
of reconciling our differences. From war to peace is . . . 
from the futile to the effective, from the strategic to the 
active, from the destructive to the creative way of life . . . . 
 
The world will be regenerated by the people who rise above 
these passive ways and heroically seek, by whatever 
hardship, by whatever toil, the methods by which people 
can agree (Follett 1918, 357-58). 
 
But in Follett’s view, this hard work is essential, because only a peace that truly 
addresses the interests generating the conflict can be meaningful and sustainable. As we 
consider the adoption of deliberative models, we should ask whether they are committed 
to rise above passive avoidance to do the deep work of finding true common ground.  
We Cannot Do It Alone 
Given the difficulty of this work, it is unsurprising that integrative models 
incorporate ongoing support for the participants in the form of training and facilitation. 
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These are essential to the success of the model. As anyone who has attended a “town 
hall” meeting that has turned into a raucous protest can understand, an unstructured 
process can quickly go off the rails (Foran 2017; Taylor 2017). And yet, deliberative 
democrats can be remarkably unspecific in how they anticipate that the mechanics of a 
deliberative process will unfold, beyond perhaps the initial framing of a structure and 
some ground rules to be announced by the person who is nominally “in charge” of the 
proceedings. Deliberation would benefit from two insights of integrative problem-solving 
in how to make such a process work, even in the face of passionate disagreement. 
First, training is essential to obtaining meaningful commitment to the structure 
and rules of the deliberative process. Training goes beyond simply announcing the rules 
that will be followed to actually explaining why the process is designed the way it is and 
what the participants stand to gain by working the process as designed. Understanding 
why a rule exists not only incentivizes compliance, but it also begins to communicate 
values of inclusion and respect from the very outset of the proceedings. Participants are 
not merely players in a script they did not write and may not understand; it is essential 
to the process that they can fully participate and that they are being trained so that all of 
them can effectively do so. The process commitments obtained at the end of the training 
process are thus informed ones, empowering the participants to regulate their own 
behavior and assisting both the facilitator and other participants in enforcing the ground 
rules by referencing their shared understanding of the process and the ground rules they 
created and to which they agreed. 
Second, and perhaps most important, integrative models do not depend on the 
participants being able both to participate in and to administer the decisional process. 
Skilled facilitation enables the participants to fully engage in the challenging work of 
exploring the interests that motivate their own positions and fully attending to and 
addressing the interests of others. As the participants move from their inventory of 
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interests to the discovery and creation of solutions, the facilitator helps the parties to set 
aside pre-existing positional thinking and open themselves to new and innovative 
options. Last, as the participants begin circling in on possible agreements by evaluating 
and selecting among the options they have generated, the facilitator assists with 
clarifying the agreement under consideration and encouraging the parties to persist and 
overcome impasses. At each stage, the facilitator uses a variety of strategies, including 
serving as the process expert (and giving reminders when necessary); modeling expected 
behavior (both in action and in express explanations and on-the-spot training); 
increasing mutual understanding through supportive questioning; offering synthesizing 
comments where a conversation has been broad ranging; helping people reluctant to talk 
to find their voices; working separately with individuals or sub-groups locked in 
unproductive conflict; and defusing tensions through process reminders, strategic 
breaks, and affirmations of the appropriate role of both positive and negative emotions. 
A description provided by a management official who participated in early IBN 
efforts at Kaiser provides several examples of how facilitation works and how it is 
experienced by participants in the process: 
To do this process, you need a knowledgeable facilitator 
who knows when to challenge, when to allow people to go 
off process, when to keep them on process. It is not easy, 
and it takes constant skills of facilitation, reminding people 
that “that was a position,” or “that was an interest,” or “are 
we coming up with solutions that are meeting everyone’s 
interests?” And if someone didn’t like a particular solution, 
are they taking responsibility for finding another solution? 
Individuals who serve as facilitators need to be thoroughly 
knowledgeable about the interest-based process in order to 
be able to do all of this. 
(McKersie, Eaton, and Kochan 2004, 33). 
Facilitation is materially different from the moderation common in many 
facilitative models. The National Issues Forum (NIF) provides one such example. I was 
recently asked to moderate an NIF-based session at a national conference on civic 
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engagement in colleges and universities. After years of experience empowering 
participants to define and resolve their own conflicts in an integrative context, the 
differences were startling. All of the work that we would do in an integrative process had 
already been done for us. A starter video presented a prepackaged set of facts regarding 
the issue we were to consider, and experts had prescribed a menu of solutions, without 
providing their underlying reasoning or any opportunity for us to discuss or question 
them. The ground rules were similarly pre-baked and not subject to discussion, and time 
limits were strictly prescribed. There was no joint training of participants. The 
moderator’s role had effectively been limited to pressing play on the video, handing out 
the papers, keeping time, some minor prodding of participants, and taking notes 
(though, in this particular instance, due to unique circumstances, that part of the role 
was eliminated). The participants’ role, in turn, was focused on trying to find reasons to 
support one of the menu of available policy solutions, none of which they seemed to find 
particularly desirable. And even though the people attending the conference are all 
professionally engaged in and committed to improving democratic discourse, some were 
clearly frustrated and dissatisfied with the experience (in the nicest possible way). The 
process bore a close similarity to a market research focus group – let’s find out what 
people are thinking so we can make changes to capture their approval. Facilitation, as 
opposed to mere moderation, permits a more active and robust process and frees the 
participants to delve more deeply into the problem at hand, with resulting solutions that 
are correspondingly better at addressing the interests and needs at stake.   
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Chapter Nine 
Joint Inquiry in Pursuit of Deliberative Models 
Assuming that I have made a convincing case for the advantages integrative 
approaches could have for deliberation in the democratic political context, how would we 
begin? In this concluding chapter, I touch briefly on some of the areas of future 
development and study suggested by my analysis. In the spirit of the joint inquiry 
process used by participants in an integrative process, I intend here to sketch topics on 
which those of us who wish to improve democratic decision-making and deliberation 
might explore in furthering our search for mutually agreeable and workable solutions.  
Implementing Integration 
Unlike a labor-management setting in which the potential stakeholders are easily 
identifiable and may already fall into organized groups with elected or appointed leaders, 
the political sphere is larger and more amorphous. The problems to be resolved in the 
political context may be harder to identify and define than those addressed by labor-
management processes, which often focus on the revision of specific pre-existing 
contractual or policy procedures. Moreover, as in any shift in political process, existing 
institutions are likely to be resistant to letting decisions be made by new methods they do 
not control.  
As with IBN’s evolution in the labor-management setting, implementing 
integrative politics would likely be a matter of seizing opportunities as they arose. These 
opportunities could come in the form of existing deliberative processes that are 
experiencing difficulty or open to experimentation; with the election of leaders familiar 
with IBN in a business setting; or with an institution such as a political subdivision, 
neighborhood, school, or community organization facing a difficult and divisive problem.  
Choosing such a specific issue as the locus of implementation draws on the 
particular strength of integrative models in addressing matters that have concrete and 
			 101 
imminent effects on the participants. Integration draws its strength from the potential 
options revealed when interests are fully understood, and participants have the most 
knowledge of their interests regarding matters that directly affect them. In these 
contexts, integration is most likely to deliver on its promise of finding better and more 
lasting solutions, thereby demonstrating its potential to participants who may 
themselves become proponents of the model in other contexts. I have seen this among 
the many individuals I have trained over the years, who have gone on from participating 
in a single instance of IBN to advocate for its use in other institutions and settings with 
which they are involved.  
And if the integrative process is able to identify a mutually agreeable solution, 
even if the process has not been given the authority to enact that solution in a binding 
manner, the availability of a pre-packaged solution is likely to be very tempting to those 
officials who do have the authority to adopt it by legislative or executive action. By 
accepting the solution proposed by the integrative process, those officials can conserve 
their own resources for conflict on issues that may not be so easily resolved. A recent 
example of this phenomenon took place in Arizona, where factions from widely disparate 
ideological backgrounds came together to develop a plan to overhaul the state’s fiscally 
challenged public safety pension system (Arizona Capitol Times 2016; Chieppo 2016; 
Gilroy, Constant, and Randazzo 2016; Robb 2016). Seasoned political commentators 
expressed shock that a group composed of “public employee unions and libertarian 
wonks” could “blaze[] new ground on a difficult and emotional topic that is producing 
paralysis around the country,” describing the complex resulting proposal as “paradigm 
busting” (Robb 2016). But the participants described how they were able to break 
through their prior conflicts by focusing on their interests and evaluating potential 
solutions based on whether they would meet those interests (Constant, Randazzo, and 
Gilroy 2016). Like the Kaiser management and union leaders who met in secret in the 
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Dallas airport in 1995, the participants in the public safety pension talks found – to their 
shock – that exploration of their interests revealed the meaningful common ground on 
which a solution could be built (Arizona Capitol Times 2016). Although implementation 
of the solution required both the passage of legislation and an amendment to the state 
constitution, the availability of a solution agreeable to major interest groups was 
sufficient to facilitate the necessary legal formalities, with the legislature passing 
enabling legislation and referring an amendment for popular consideration, and more 
than 70% of voters approving the constitutional amendment at a special election 
(Arizona Secretary of State 2016; Chieppo 2016). Satisfaction with the process was 
sufficiently high that a similar collaborative approach was used the subsequent year to 
examine and amend a separate and also struggling pension fund for corrections officers 
(Gilroy, Randazzo, and Constant 2017). Although the deliberative process lacked formal 
power, it was nonetheless able to have its proposals implemented, demonstrating the 
power of deliberative processes that run parallel to governmental institutions to achieve 
measurable results. Moreover, the adoption of the process in a subsequent legislative 
cycle to tackle a similar problem supports the thesis, advanced above, that integrative 
models can build support through their ability to deliver workable solutions. 
Evaluating Deliberation 
The specificity of integrative methods may also provide valuable insights for 
empirical efforts to study deliberative democracy. In this work, I have described the 
specific methods of integrative problem-solving in detail and explained how and why 
they work to address the concerns of capacity, epistemology, power, and feasibility that 
have arisen from other efforts to implement deliberative democracy. Process matters. 
This insight suggests that efforts to assess the prospects of deliberative 
democracy empirically would benefit from particular focus on the impact that the 
method of deliberation has on the quality and results of the deliberative process. I have 
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taken the position that skilled facilitation is particularly important to the success of 
integrative methods, and that is a proposition that could be empirically tested through a 
research design that specifically isolated and measured the effects of different types of 
moderation and facilitation. Other areas of potential empirical inquiry into methods 
could include how to train participants for effective participation, how to investigate and 
share factual information to support constructive dialogue, what factors increase the 
likelihood that a solution developed in a deliberative process will be implemented (if 
more formal implementation is required), and what becomes of integrative solutions in 
the months and years following their initial development. 
The integrative model I have advocated here is also highly dependent on 
repeated, in-person interactions, generally stretching over a series of sessions that may 
take months or years. Not every problem can be approached that way; many issues 
require more rapid resolution or cannot marshal the resource investment that would be 
required, while others involve people who are not located in the same place and cannot 
participate in an in-person process. Some problems may be best addressed through 
hybrid processes, using integrative models combined with or followed by other modes, 
much as the Kaiser negotiators did when negotiating their contracts subsequent to the 
adoption of IBN. If integration is to be as useful as it can be to the quality of democratic 
deliberation, then another productive area of inquiry would be the extent to which its 
methods can be modified to work in other settings. Can the process be done more quickly 
while avoiding the trap of positional thinking? Does a fast process still provide the 
improved relationships and understanding that are a key benefit of even those 
integrative sessions that do not find a complete solution? How can we solve problems 
that reach across broader physical ranges, such that interested parties cannot sit in the 
same room and talk face-to-face? Do new developments in technology-enabled 
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communication provide meaningful substitutes for in-person work, or do these digital 
modes of relation fall flat? 
Rethinking Representation 
The centrality of interests to integrative problem-solving also has implications for 
representation. Throughout the integrative process, the participants are asked to focus 
on interests – what interests are at stake, what solutions might be possible, and which 
solutions meet as many interests as possible while doing minimal damage to the 
interests they do not meet. To some extent, this will always require participants to learn 
about the interests of persons not in the room. Even a group that seems to be unified 
around a common interest, such as a union with voluntary membership, will find 
noteworthy variations among its members in terms of their interests and the intensity 
and priority they assign to those interests. Moreover, as the representative engages in a 
transformative process, the constituents do not, so the challenge for the representative 
increases as the process grows longer. A representative of even a closely aligned group, 
then, must endeavor to survey the interests of group members and bring those back for 
consideration in the process, in order for the process to achieve solutions that will meet 
the needs of the representative’s group. And this process of constituent involvement 
must proceed on a regular basis so as to convey the changes the interests undergo as the 
transformative process does its work. Although this aspect of constituent engagement is 
often challenging, the representative’s ability to perform this function is aided by the fact 
that the representative her- or himself is likely to have overlapping interests with other 
members of the group, and members of the group are likely to already understand and 
believe that they share interests, giving the representative a reservoir of existing trust to 
draw on when asking group members to reveal strongly held personal preferences and to 
consider alternative methods of meeting their needs. 
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It is not clear that a representative elected through more traditional aggregative 
methods would be able to either engage with constituents to learn their interests and 
explore solutions or effectively represent the interests of their constituents in an 
integrative process. The structure of American elected government is strongly tied to 
geography. The overwhelming majority of representatives are elected from a specific 
physical area, be it a city council ward, state legislative or congressional district, or state. 
Even the country’s national leader is elected using a system that filters the popular vote 
through an electoral college comprised of representatives of states. Leaving aside the 
extent to which the drawing of the lines of these districts is itself a hotly contested battle 
for relative power, the reality of modern life is that only a small portion of the matters 
addressed by government are ones on which people’s interests are likely to be more 
closely aligned with their physical neighbors than with those of fellow citizens scattered 
throughout the city, state, or nation. And even issues that appear to have a strong 
geographical locus may have strong affects outside their narrow area. While I may have 
an interest in the quality of the neighborhood school my children attend, what and how 
those children learn (in terms of academic knowledge as well as character and values) 
will affect people who are not my neighbors. The newly constructed highway that brings 
pollution and noise to my backyard may be necessary to permit people living in another 
part of the state or country to have access to healthcare or economic opportunity. 
Moreover, even where interests are tied to geography, they are likely not uniform within 
the constituency making up a geographic district, which is likely to comprise individuals 
in different socio-economic circumstances; holding a variety of different jobs; living in a 
range of urban, suburban, and rural settings; and with a variety of racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, genders and sexual orientations, and religious and political beliefs. That 
one representative could adequately assess and present all their interests seems unlikely, 
particularly as the size of the district grows. 
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While political scientists have recently begun to examine whether the conflict 
resolution strategies developed by negotiation practitioners could decrease polarization 
and impasse among elected representatives (Foster, Mansbridge, and Martin 2013; 
Warren and Mansbridge 2013), this examination has generally assumed that those 
representatives would continue to be drawn from geographic districts, with the attendant 
contestation of district lines and single-member, winner-take-all elections that are often 
won by narrow margins. Making full use of integration’s lessons may require critical 
engagement with this assumption, and provides additional insights for consideration in 
the developing literature addressing alternative models of selection that emphasize the 
alignment of the voters’ views (rather than their geographic location) with that of the 
representative, such as multi-member districts and preferential or ranked-choice voting 
(Erdman and Susskind 2008, 118-19). The essential role that understanding interests 
plays in effective problem-solving provides both an additional impetus to study new 
methods of selecting representatives and a metric for use in evaluating the likely effect of 
proposed new methods. 
Building Civic and Personal Capacity 
Finally, but perhaps most important, this study suggests a further area of 
productive research regarding the effect of integrative problem-solving on our collective 
life. A recurring theme in my own experiences in integrative bargaining, in training 
others to do so, and in facilitating the resolution of complex disputes and policy 
development is that of personal transformation. Both during and after the negotiation 
process, participants speak with wonder of how what they have learned through the 
process has changed the way they interact with others outside of the negotiating room. 
They report productive conversations with otherwise withdrawn or combative teenagers, 
de-escalation of conflicts with intimate partners, and successful resolution of difficult 
workplace interactions. I have also seen participants who began tentatively and needed 
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to be drawn into the discussion go on to hold leadership roles in the workplace and in 
their associations and to expand their involvement in political and non-profit work.  
Among the most deeply concerning objections to democratic participation is that 
engagement in politics may actually make our lives worse, deepening conflicts and 
making enemies of neighbors who were previously able to coexist (Brennan 2016, 235-
45). If interest-based methods can not only find ways for preexisting enemies to coexist, 
but can also encourage meaningful participation in other areas of communal life and 
teach conflict resolution skills that transfer to participants’ private lives, then this 
possibility seems to merit optimistic and thorough exploration.  
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